Hezbollah confronts a shifting political landscape under Iranian influence
It would be extremely naïve and dangerously misleading to dismiss the possibility that Hezbollah might turn its weapons inward against Lebanon itself, repeating historical missteps it has made in the past. These actions have come to define its trajectory in the eyes of most Lebanese groups, stripping it of any “resistance” character, even in relation to Israel.
This is why President Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam, along with political forces opposed to Hezbollah's direction, its alliances, and its practices that bypass the state, as well as the broader Lebanese consensus rejecting its wars, must keep the risk of unrest and internal strife at the forefront of all future expectations. This is especially important as direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel have become the key strategic development in the Middle East, ranking just after the rapidly advancing US–Iran talks, which have already led to two preliminary rounds of Lebanese–Israeli discussions in Washington this week.
Outdated methods
Nevertheless, the tendency to threaten internal political, sectarian, or ruling structures with armed force appears to be a relic of an obsolete mechanism that history has already discarded, even in a country suffering from the afflictions of failed states, where history repeats itself as a symptom of backwardness and extremism.
The era of the 1980s, when the Syrian regime along with a coalition of Lebanese, Palestinian, and leftist forces overturned the May 17 Agreement, is gone and will not return, having ended with the collapse of Syrian tutelage and the end of the Assad system.
The time of the February 6, 1984 uprising in West Beirut is also impossible to revive, as its symbols have for decades become pillars of the Taif state order. Likewise, the bloody May 7, 2008 takeover of West Beirut carried out by Hezbollah has become unthinkable to repeat. If such madness were even contemplated as a “gain,” it would place the party in direct confrontation with all Lebanese armed forces without exception and would dangerously push many Lebanese groups toward taking up arms and taking to the streets against it.
Hezbollah's isolation
More importantly, the reality of the party and its sponsor Iran, after the wars they fought in recent months and years, and the outcomes of those confrontations with the United States, Israel, and all the Gulf states directly, has overturned and dismantled much of what came before. This simply means that relying on any previous calculations, policies, or habitual practices based on past displays of strength in the Lebanese street will amount to riding a catastrophic wave whose consequences cannot even be measured against those of direct war with their enemies.
Accordingly, it becomes essential for those within the Hezbollah's camp who glorify the past to reconsider the catastrophic pattern being promoted within its base through rhetoric of intimidation, threats, and accusations of betrayal against everyone without exception. This violent tendency will only lead to further isolation of the party and its environment, and will fuel gratuitous hostility and hatred without any horizon.
The rejection of Lebanese–Israeli negotiations will remain a legitimate position for the party up to the moment when its most serious mistakes are revealed after the errors of being drawn into war, namely if it slips into internal Lebanese confrontation involving street violence and weapons. What requires urgent warning is a “retro” and outdated tendency, even if the party’s and Iran’s calculations would suggest avoiding such a misstep. The party’s discourse and its closely aligned media rely on fully militarized classifications for anyone who is not “Hezbollah,” in an almost delirious generalization. All “others” are either Zionists, traitors, or agents of America and Israel, while the state is described as shameful.
In this direction, Hezbollah confronts negotiations and a reality that would not have been imaginable had it not been for its relationship of deadly subordination to Tehran.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.