On March 24, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced the appointment of General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, succeeding the “martyr” Ali Larijani, who was killed in an Israeli raid.

The mere appointment of Zolghadr at this moment of crisis shows how the Islamic Republic adapts under pressure. Instead of choosing a diplomat, or technocrat, or a well-known political figure, the regime chose someone close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose career spanned asymmetric warfare, internal security, institutional coordination, and coercive state management.

This move indicates that the Islamic regime is reinforcing its core decision-making structure around a figure linked to maintaining the regime through discipline and control, with more emphasis on scientific coordination than flexibility. Before the 1979 Revolution, Zolghadr joined a secret Islamic terrorist organization called “Mansouroun,” which in 1978 took part in the killing of the American executive director of the “Paul E. Grimm” oil company and his Iranian colleague, Malik Mahmoud Boroujerdi, in southern Iran.

Later, Zolghadr publicly acknowledged his role in assassination attempts carried out by “Mansouroun.” Furthermore, Zolghadr was more involved in the role played by the Iran-Iraq War in shaping his experience as a leader in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The importance of his role lies in what can be described as the building of a cross-border and cross-system security structure. Zolghadr described the association he founded as operating at an organizational level comparable to that of a government, aimed not only at confronting Iraqi forces but also at expanding the Islamic Revolution within Iraq. This positioned him among the cadres who early on came to view war not only as a means of defense but also as a tool for reshaping the political environment beyond Iran’s borders, with the goal of “exporting the revolution” and expanding the regime’s influence.

After the war with Iraq, he served for eight years, from 1989 to 1997, as Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Guard under Mohsen Rezaee’s leadership, and another eight years as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Guard, this time under Yahya Rahim Safavi’s command, gaining extensive insight into the internal workings of the security establishment. During that period, the Guard evolved from a revolutionary fighting force into a broader state institution with expanding political, intelligence, economic, and regional roles.

Zolghadr became part of the upper leadership echelon overseeing the institutional transformation of the Guard and its maturation into a central tool for exercising power within the regime. During President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tenure, he moved into the position of Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs, where he faced a Sunni insurgency in Sistan and Baluchestan, Kurdish unrest, and renewed activity in the northwest. Later, he moved to the Iranian judiciary, first serving in the area of crime prevention and social security in 2009.

Then he was tasked with integrating the tools of state security more systematically across institutions. In 2021, he became Secretary-General of the Expediency Discernment Council, a body designed to resolve bureaucratic disputes but with a clear ideological dimension. Such senior positions are typically entrusted to close allies tasked with aligning key institutions. The Supreme National Security Council, which Zolghadr was appointed to lead, is one of the main coordinating bodies in the fields of defense, intelligence, and foreign policy. It is officially chaired by the president and sits at the intersection of the armed forces, intelligence agencies, the civilian executive branch, and the Office of the Supreme Leader.

The placement of Zolghadr in place of Larijani indicates that Tehran seeks a secretary-general whose comparative advantage is not negotiation skills, but the ability to integrate coercive instruments of power in crisis conditions. This is particularly significant in the current wartime environment, marked by leadership losses and increasing pressure on the command-and-control system. A figure with Zolghadr's background is suited to maintaining cohesion across the military, intelligence, judiciary, and broader political-security apparatus when leadership is uncertain and under strain. His previous experience suggests he is a capable administrator of a system centered on disciplined, centralized governance.

In summary, his promotion can be read in the context of a regime prepared to consider limited concessions under intense wartime pressure through channels such as Pakistan. His appointment signals that any meaningful concessions would be routed through the regime’s security core rather than the traditional diplomatic apparatus led by Abbas Araghchi. This suggests that the Trump administration may, in effect, have to engage in negotiations with circles closely aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Noting that they participated extensively in the suppression of dissent within Iran. It will become clear if the war does not lead to the regime’s collapse. This likely positions Zolghadr as the principal manager of Iran’s post-war stance. He will determine the scope of domestic repression, the possible level of external escalation, and the degree of control between the military, intelligence, judicial, and executive bodies under pressure. This role could have a significant impact on decision-making and implementation. The selection of Zolghadr, with his long history of exercising military power rather than acting as a conciliatory, technocratic, or national political mediator, would ensure the continuation of repression and control to maintain the regime. For U.S. officials, he would be the principal decision-maker in negotiations over a ceasefire, the reduction of naval tensions, or broader ballistic frameworks. He is likely to be a leading decision-maker, at times even more influential than the Supreme Leader.

From a Western perspective, his appointment should not be considered reassuring, as his record, unlike Larijani and his predecessors, indicates deep involvement in the regime’s internal mechanisms and limited experience in dealing with foreign actors. Of course, he is not the sole center of power within the evolving Iranian leadership. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf retains significant influence, alongside figures such as Mohsen Rezaee, a former IRGC commander, while the apparent center of gravity increasingly lies with the Revolutionary Guard. This shift further reduces the relative prominence of the clerical establishment.