MP Hassan Fadlallah stated: “This authority should prioritize the interests of their country and protect the blood of its people by immediately seizing the available international opportunity, thanks to Iran’s steadfast position alongside Lebanon, which insists on stopping the aggression against Lebanon before negotiations in Islamabad begin.”

Up until the final moments before the negotiations in Islamabad, Iran was competing with Lebanon, seeking to align the ceasefire conditions with its own terms rather than those of Lebanon or the United States’ request to Israel for a ceasefire.

Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader, affirmed that Lebanon’s stability depends solely on the combined efforts of the Lebanese government and the resistance. He emphasized that the Prime Minister of Lebanon should recognize that ignoring the role of the resistance and Hezbollah exposes Lebanon to security risks.

This reflects Iran’s desire to maintain the “army, people, and resistance” formula, in which Hezbollah functions as an equal partner to the Lebanese state—if not a decisive authority within it.

Security deployment in front of the government headquarters (Nabil Ismail).

The party’s main objection appears to relate more to who is conducting the negotiations rather than the negotiations themselves, which remain open to discussion. MP Hassan Fadlallah reiterated: “This authority should place the interests of their country first and protect the blood of its people by immediately seizing the available international opportunity, thanks to Iran’s steadfast position alongside Lebanon, which insists on stopping the aggression against Lebanon before negotiations in Islamabad begin.”

It is both strange and paradoxical that the party urges Lebanon to effectively delegate its decision-making to Iran in order to strengthen its position, rather than the party itself delegating its decisions to the Lebanese state to reinforce that state’s authority, enhance its negotiating power, and secure a stronger collective national stance.

Up until the final moments before the negotiations in Islamabad were convened, Iran was competing with Lebanon and seeking to ensure that the ceasefire would be based on its own conditions rather than on Lebanon’s request—or that of the United States—for Israel to halt the fighting.

However, its positive stance, if it can indeed be described as such, was meant to remind the Americans that what Washington had reportedly agreed to, according to various indicators—namely a full ceasefire including Lebanon, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected—also served to remind them that leaving Lebanon’s file in Iran’s hands carries significant risks. Chief among these is effectively granting Iran leverage over Lebanon at a time when U.S. efforts are focused on neutralizing Hezbollah, cutting off its Iranian supply lines, and limiting Iran’s influence along the border with Israel.

This is occurring at a time when the party, while still relying on its military capabilities, appears to have diminished deterrent power to prevent Israeli advances in the south. Reports suggest a reduced capacity to sustain prolonged rocket fire and a weakening of its defensive posture against a potential strategic setback.

This perceived decline is increasing its sense of anxiety and is reflected in a more volatile internal response, pushing the country toward uncertain and potentially dangerous trajectories. At the same time, it continues to openly criticize the authorities, which it views as aligned with Iran or as seeking to relinquish the “Lebanon card.”

Despite the complex trajectory of the anticipated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Lebanon is nonetheless compelled to define its position amid ongoing efforts to reshape the region’s balance. Following the American–Iranian negotiations in Islamabad on the 14th of this month, a new meeting of the quartet committee—comprising Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—is expected to convene, with the aim of preparing for the post-war regional landscape regarding Iran and its position vis-à-vis neighboring states and the broader region.

Meanwhile, based on available diplomatic indicators and an understanding of Israel’s objectives following October 7, it appears unlikely that previous arrangements could simply be reinstated. Proposals such as limited withdrawals several kilometers from southern Lebanon or reliance on earlier understandings established with the party—which were subsequently breached in 2006, 2023, and 2026—are increasingly viewed as unworkable. In this context, the prospect of rebuilding the Lebanese state while ending Iranian influence over Lebanese decision-making through the party appears even more difficult, particularly in light of shifting regional power dynamics.

At the same time, if the Lebanese state is able to secure a firm foundation through American mediation—aimed at strengthening its position, especially vis-à-vis Iran and the party—beginning with an immediate ceasefire, it would likely continue to seek support through diplomatic channels and friendly states. In this regard, political and diplomatic circles argue that the appropriate reference point for negotiations should be the armistice agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel in 1949—1949 Armistice Agreements—considered by some as the basis for defining Lebanon’s borders, a position that could place the party in a politically difficult position.

Ultimately, what emerges is the need for an active and sustained diplomatic effort to balance, despite significant challenges, internal pressures with external requirements, in order to steer Lebanon through a highly complex and delicate phase. Further developments in this context remain to be seen.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.