On March 29, 2026, the Syrian news agency reported that units of the Syrian Arab Army, during operations to secure border areas, discovered two tunnels extending between Syrian and Lebanese territories around the village of Hosh al-Sayed Ali in the western Homs countryside. Although this recently discovered facility on the Syrian side has gained a reputation as the largest weapon storage facility in the area and was subjected to multiple Israeli raids from the Lebanese side, it was not the only one. In the rugged geography stretching between the Lebanese Bekaa and the Syrian interior, the border has never been merely a sovereign line drawn on maps, but a gray area governed more by facts than by laws.

Here, underground, a complex network of tunnels was created, whose function has evolved over the decades from purely military purposes to a hybrid structure combining strategic use with illicit activities, directly reflecting the state crises in both countries.

Historically, the roots of the tunnels date back to before the rise of Hezbollah, when Palestinian factions—especially the "Popular Front – General Command" and "Fatah al-Intifada"—were the first to establish an underground military infrastructure in areas like Qousaya and Yanta. These sites were not just bases, but comprehensive "security islands," containing heavy weapons storage and rocket launchers, directly connected to Syrian territory through secret passages that ensured the rotation of supplies and personnel away from the authority of the Lebanese state.

At that stage, the tunnels were part of a regional system led by Damascus, serving both as instruments of direct influence within Lebanon and as a means of maintaining security and military balance. However, with the rise of Hezbollah, this structure evolved from limited Palestinian use to a far more complex network.

Hezbollah: Tunnels as a strategic backbone

For Hezbollah, tunnels were not merely a tactical option but a cornerstone of its military structure, forming a critical part of its logistical and operational network; these underground passages have served as key supply lines for transporting missiles, ammunition, and drones from allies such as Iran and through Syrian territory into Lebanon, away from the scrutiny and targeting of Israel.

The Ministry of Defense closes two smuggling tunnels on the Syrian-Lebanese border (SANA).

These tunnels developed into advanced engineering facilities, equipped with electricity, ventilation systems, and cement pathways, with some entrances beginning within civilian homes as a tactic to camouflage them and utilize the civilian environment as cover. The Qusayr area, in particular, served as a central node in this network, acting as a connection point between the Syrian interior and the Lebanese Bekaa. This model reached its peak before 2024, when the tunnels were built and operated under an official Syrian umbrella, granting them a degree of political and security protection.

According to local sources from the Baalbek-Hermel area, Hezbollah's tunnels and facilities in these regions have multiplied and evolved, particularly during the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and Hezbollah's involvement in it. These sources report that Hezbollah’s underground network extended from Qalad al-Sabaa to Brital, most notably including the Zakbah facility and tunnel near Wadi Hanna in Hermel, which reached into the Syrian Qusayr countryside and was used for military equipment and the transport of heavy weapons. The facility was subjected to Israeli raids during the "Uli al-Baas" battle from both the Lebanese and Syrian sides and remains monitored by Israeli drones, restricting access from the Lebanese side. There is also significant discussion in the region about the "Imad 1" facility between Ebsh (Qabsh) near Hawik in Lebanon and Sad in Syria, as well as the "Imad 4" facility connecting the Zabadani and Brital areas, which reportedly contained ballistic missiles and has been targeted multiple times by Israeli raids.

The major shift: From "state cover" to security pursuit

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 marked a pivotal turning point. Suddenly, these tunnels lost their political cover and became illegal passageways subject to pursuit. With the emergence of the new Syrian authority, extensive combing operations began, uncovering both primitive and advanced tunnel networks used for transporting weapons and smuggling drugs between the two countries.

This shift forced Hezbollah to strategically readjust, moving from using tunnels as open supply lines to relying on them for low-cost operations, such as transferring disassembled missiles or small drones, in order to maintain a minimal military capability.

From weapons to captagon: Tunnels' economy

The most dangerous shift in the tunnels’ function was not only military but also economic. Facing increasing financial pressures, Hezbollah began using the tunnels to smuggle Captagon and other illicit materials, marking a new phase in their operations aimed at securing alternative funding sources.

Field operations in 2026 revealed the presence of drug storage facilities alongside weapon depots within the tunnels, highlighting a clear merger of military activity and illicit economic operations. This integration is no longer an exception but has become a core part of what is now referred to as the "survival economy."

Shadow Economy: When tribes undertake what states could not

Concurrently, a new reality emerged beyond ideology, driven by local and cross-border smuggling networks. These networks, which include members of border tribes and former officers, have repurposed the tunnels for a variety of uses, ranging from human trafficking to the transport of fuel and foodstuffs.

In areas such as Wadi Khaled and Hermel, the tunnels—most of which are primitive—have ceased to be merely military tools and have instead become lifelines for a parallel economy. Individuals pay substantial amounts to cross the border, amid a lack of real economic alternatives. Consequently, addressing the tunnels is not only a security challenge but also a profound socio-economic dilemma.

Today, with growing coordination between Beirut and Damascus and mounting international pressures, the tunnel issue appears to have entered a phase of "systematic elimination." The tunnels are not merely underground excavations but represent a deeper structural imbalance: borders without full control, a state lacking a monopoly on arms, and an economy that pushes people into the shadows.

In this sense, the story of the tunnels between Lebanon and Syria is not merely an engineering or military tale but a story of a state still incomplete, with its sovereignty remaining embedded underground.