As the end of the year approaches, the current week has been described as 'critical' and 'pivotal' for Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and even Ukraine.

With the conclusion of Donald Trump's first year in office near, Washington desires tangible results to transition to the next phases, whether in the implementation of the 'Gaza Agreement' which remains frozen due to Israeli violations, in de-escalating and extending American deadlines in Lebanon after altering the nature of negotiations on the 'mechanism,' or in moderating Israeli behavior towards Damascus, particularly as joint American-Syrian operations against ISIS have commenced and are progressing. However, the clash of interests with Trump at this stage exacerbates the personal-political issues for Benjamin Netanyahu and undermines the internal and regional objectives of the extremist group he leads.

More importantly, this discord revives some of Iran's aspirations for external influence, as it senses that Trump is no longer immediately concerned with continuing the Israeli war against it to weaken or change its regime.

Before the arrival of American envoy Tom Barrack, Netanyahu received a stern message from Washington following the assassination of Hamas leader Raed Saad, and was informed that certain officials in the administration unleashed a barrage of insults against him, accusing him of continuing to manipulate the ceasefire in Gaza.

Washington has never handled an assassination in this manner, but its priority now is the success of the 'Trump Plan,' particularly as his initiatives to end the 'Eight Wars' have faced failure after failure.

Undoubtedly, Barrack's mission is delicate and sensitive, as its timing two weeks before the Trump-Netanyahu meeting aims to remind the latter of 'American demands' that need to be met in advance.

However, he failed to convince his mini-cabinet because it would mean agreeing to the terms to end the Gaza war, to form an international force, and merely to 'freeze' or 'contain' Hamas' weaponry instead of insisting on 'forcibly disarming' it.

If the Trump administration succeeds in taming the Israeli fervor regarding Gaza, which is feasible as long as Hamas adopts a facilitating approach and proposes 'freezing' its weapons, then it can be supposed that this will affect Lebanon and Syria.

However, Hamas is currently coordinating with intermediaries, namely Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar.

Meanwhile, 'Iran's Party/Hezbollah' in Lebanon awaits instructions from Tehran, and they are not prepared to make any concessions without an equivalent return.

This is because 'containment' or 'freezing' would subject the weapons to stringent measures to ensure they are not usable in favor of any party. Hamas has reached the conviction that its situation (and interest) in Gaza and all of Palestine requires such a 'sacrifice,' whereas the 'party' (and Iran) does not feel secure in Lebanon without its heavy weaponry.

"Hezbollah" sent its representative in Iran (Abdullah Safi al-Din) to the closest authority to the Iranian Supreme Leader to convey that 'the party today is stronger than ever,' meaning it is not seeking 'calm.' He received a confirmation from Ali Akbar Velayati for 'continuing to support the party firmly because it plays a pivotal role in confronting Israel.'

In contrast, Tehran continues to release bubbles of non-interference in Lebanese affairs, and its Foreign Minister seeks dialogue with his Lebanese counterpart, perhaps to convince him that for Lebanon-the-state, it is in its interest to be a 'card' in Iran's negotiations with America. However, the negotiations are currently on hold pending developments in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.