Lebanon Between War and Negotiation The Only Question That Matters Is Lebanon’s Interest
For decades, Lebanon has paid the price of wars, confrontations, and regional struggles that repeatedly
exceeded its capacity, fractured its institutions, exhausted its economy, and wounded its society. Today, as
negotiations begin in Washington between Lebanon and Israel under American sponsorship, the country
faces a defining question:
Will Lebanon finally negotiate according to its own national interest, or will it once again serve as a
battlefield through which others negotiate their conflicts and ambitions?
This moment is not merely about borders, ceasefires, or diplomacy. It is about defining what kind of state
Lebanon intends to become after years of collapse, paralysis, displacement, economic devastation, and
internal fragmentation.
Following two rounds of talks in Washington, a new phase of negotiations is expected to begin between
Lebanese and Israeli representatives under direct American sponsorship. The discussions reportedly focus
on ceasefire arrangements, border security, reconstruction, prisoners, and broader political understandings
that could eventually reshape the relationship between Lebanon and Israel.
Inside Lebanon, the negotiations have already exposed profound political divisions.
One camp, aligned with Hezbollah and the so called “axis of resistance,” views the negotiations as an
American Israeli effort to weaken Hezbollah and reduce Iran’s regional influence. For this camp, opposing
negotiations is not simply resistance to American influence in the region. It is also the defense of Iranian
geopolitical priorities, even when those priorities conflict with Lebanon’s own national interests.
The contradiction between Iranian regional agendas and Lebanese national interests was one of the
central factors that dragged Lebanon back into war. The internal escalation has now reached dangerous
levels, with President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam publicly accused by extremist voices
of betrayal and collaboration with Israel, including the circulation of manipulated images portraying
President Aoun as an Israeli Rabbi in areas under the influence of Hezbollah supporters.
Another camp, strongly anti Hezbollah and aligned with Western and Gulf positions, sees the negotiations
as a historic opportunity to decisively end Hezbollah’s military role and reposition Lebanon fully within theWestern and Arab political order. Some voices within this camp increasingly speak in the language of
victory and defeat, as though Lebanon’s internal wounds and sensitivities no longer exist.
Both approaches carry the same danger: transforming Lebanon once again into an arena serving the
agendas of others instead of protecting its own national interest.
Lebanon must negotiate according to one standard only: the sovereign national interest of the Lebanese
state and the protection of the Lebanese citizen, the Lebanese economy, and Lebanon’s future as a
functioning state.
The immediate Lebanese priorities are clear:
• A full and immediate ceasefire.
• Complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territories.
• The return of prisoners and detainees.
• The safe return of displaced civilians.
• A serious international reconstruction effort for southern Lebanon and all affected areas.
These are not political luxuries. They are humanitarian necessities.
But Lebanon’s interest cannot stop at ending the current violence. The deeper national objective must be
the establishment of a fully sovereign state capable of producing sustainable political, security, economic,
and social stability for generations to come.
Whether the current process eventually leads to formal peace, long term security arrangements, or another
negotiated framework is secondary to one central question:
Will it protect Lebanon from perpetual destruction and recurring wars?
One reality is becoming increasingly unavoidable: there can be no future for any military structure operating
outside the authority of the Lebanese state, including Hezbollah as an armed military force or as an Iranian
military arm inside Lebanon.
At the same time, this must never become an attempt to marginalize, isolate, or humiliate the Lebanese
Shia community.
The Lebanese Shia are a founding and essential component of the Lebanese national fabric, and their
political, social, economic, and national role remains fundamental to Lebanon’s future and stability.
The objective cannot be replacing one form of domination with another.Nor can negotiations become:
• A project to humiliate the Shia community.
• A process designed to create winners and losers inside Lebanon.
That would be a historic mistake.
Sustainable peace and stability can only emerge through national inclusion, institutional legitimacy, and
equal partnership under the authority of the state.
The objective is not the destruction of a community.
The objective is the reconstruction of a state.
That reconstruction, however, extends far beyond rebuilding destroyed villages in the South. Lebanon must
rebuild:
• Its economy.
• Its institutions.
• Investor confidence.
• Social trust.
• And the belief that the country can once again function as a viable state.
This cannot be achieved through slogans.
It requires stability, functioning institutions, legal certainty, international partnerships, and economic reform.
It also requires recognizing the central role of the legitimate private sector, which remains one of the few
sectors still capable of driving recovery and reconstruction.
Lebanon cannot rebuild its future through parallel economies, smuggling networks, war economies, corrupt
financial structures, or political protection systems that flourished during years of institutional weakness and
conflict.
The private sector capable of rebuilding Lebanon is the productive, transparent, accountable, and
legitimate sector that creates jobs, pays taxes, sustains GDP, attracts investment, and operates within the
framework of the law and state institutions.
Those who sustain the economy and will ultimately carry the burden of reconstruction must have a seat at
the table.Those who contributed to destruction cannot alone design reconstruction.
At this critical moment, one principle must remain absolutely clear:
President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the Lebanese government, and the official
negotiating delegation are the sole legitimate representatives of Lebanon in these negotiations.
No parallel authority should negotiate on behalf of the Lebanese people.
No foreign capital should define Lebanon’s future.
No internal faction should monopolize national decision making outside constitutional institutions.
After decades of serving as a battlefield for others, Lebanon now faces a defining test: whether it can finally
become a sovereign state that acts first for its own people.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.