There is no longer hope for ending the war except through negotiation, and this option can succeed only if both parties have the will to reach an agreement. However, the wide gap between their conditions, ambitions, and objectives leaves no margin for error in expectations.

The Israeli war machine has spent two years seeking a “victory” in Gaza, achieving many of its military objectives and descending into the quagmire of “annihilation,” yet it has not achieved its main goals, such as reoccupying the sector or creating a Gaza without Gazans. Its remaining aim appears to be thwarting “Trump’s Peace Plan” in order to maintain its occupation of part of the sector.

Since Iran is not Gaza nor southern Lebanon, the American-Israeli war has collided with reality. Just as it seemed that airstrikes and intelligence breakthroughs were nearing the achievement of ultimate goals—especially after “cutting off the head of the Iranian leadership”—it became clear that the Tehran regime was prepared for all possibilities. However, the worst-case scenario remains: striking power stations or seizing energy installations through a ground operation in Kharg Island.

Before the American president, Donald Trump, postponed the implementation of the 48-hour ultimatum to give negotiations a third chance (after June 2025 and February 2026), he repeatedly stated that “the war is practically over,” while avoiding an “official” declaration of U.S. victory.

His ally, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was more explicit, announcing “victory” and framing it within both a biblical-historical context and a forward-looking vision. He suggested that Israel had reshaped the Middle East and would lead it after defeating Iran.

However, the “victors,” Trump and Netanyahu, have yet to receive an Iranian “surrender certificate,” meaning the war has not truly ended. On the contrary, criticism has intensified in Washington—rejecting the management and planning of the war and questioning entering it “for Israel’s sake”—as well as in Israel, where some argue that halting the war now would allow the Iranian regime to claim “victory” despite its losses.

As a result, the argument emerged that the war must continue. Since a full month of airstrikes proved inconclusive, escalation to more advanced weapons and tactics became seen as necessary.

Before the next round—expected to be the final one—a “negotiation round” must take place, possibly in Islamabad, with four main objectives.

First, to grant Iran a “last” diplomatic opportunity to accept the terms for ending the war—an outcome that is unlikely. Second, to demonstrate Iran’s aggressiveness and the threat posed by its attacks on neighboring Gulf countries. Third, to reinforce the perception of Iran as a threat to “world peace” through its nuclear and missile programs, as well as its regional proxies, which destabilize the already fragile situations in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Fourth, to justify the forthcoming escalation of combat operations as the only viable path to ending the war and preventing a broader global economic crisis.

It should be recalled that negotiations in the previous two rounds failed or were effectively thwarted, as they revolved around “surrender conditions” set by Washington and strictly upheld. This led the Iranian side to reject them, since accepting such terms would, in practice, amount to “regime change.”

In reality, these conditions represent a more stringent version of those proposed in 2018, after Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and sought to impose a new agreement.

The difference this time is that these conditions are being imposed on Iran and its proxies at a moment when they are less powerful and less capable than before.

Donald Trump and his team believe that the new reality imposed by the war has deprived Iran of the opportunity to rely on its arsenals and proxies to preserve its position, and that there is no need to offer it assistance. For this reason, entering negotiations is viewed as a way to avoid pushing the situation into broader internal chaos within Iran.

Throughout the war, Tehran did not witness meaningful international or regional solidarity. Even parties that opposed the war—on the grounds that it was not based on international law—or those that mediated to pass messages between Iran and Washington stopped short of confronting the United States on its behalf. Iran’s only tangible support came from militias it had armed and financed, many of which have become an internal burden that their respective countries and populations increasingly seek to get rid of.

As a result, for the first time, Tehran included “stopping aggression against resistance groups” among its five conditions for ending the war. However, even if negotiations succeed, they are unlikely to ensure the survival of those militias.

The roadmap appears to be moving clearly toward ground operations aimed at controlling islands such as Kharg Island, Larak Island, or Abu Musa, or even parts of the Iranian coast. Washington does not redeploy thousands of American soldiers from their bases unless they are needed for such missions.

However, key questions remain: can these forces accomplish their objectives quickly and return to their positions, and can they reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz? Iran has already succeeded in drawing them in by leveraging the threat of closing this vital passage, thereby prolonging the war, increasing its cost, and deepening the global energy crisis.

Moreover, with its ability to threaten the closure of Bab al-Mandab through the Houthis, the situation could necessitate the deployment of additional ground forces. In response to these developments, Iran has also signaled that it possesses an “army of suicide bombers.”

While such tactics may not decisively alter the course of the war, they could significantly prolong it, echoing the experience of Iraq War.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.