When the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran broke out on February 28, 2026, and perhaps for a short time afterward, some envisioned complete harmony and full alignment between Washington and Tel Aviv regarding the objectives sought from launching this war and the goals intended to be achieved.

However, as the war progressed, its escalation increased the complexities and broadened its scope. As days and events unfolded with no clear vision of its end, two things became apparent: first, there were differences between the U.S. and Israel regarding the war’s objectives; and second, for each side, goals shifted, adjusted, and changed over time in a “pendulum” manner, making it difficult to predict which objectives would remain fixed, which might change, and the timing, direction, magnitude, or depth of such changes.

Acknowledging these differences, it is crucial not to fall into the trap of exaggerating them or relying on them to potentially undermine the U.S.-Israeli alliance against Iran, as they ultimately constitute what political science terms “secondary or subsidiary contradictions,” not “fundamental or core contradictions.” The shared ground between both parties remains, at least so far, and under the current administration in Washington and government in Tel Aviv, significantly broader and deeper than the areas of dissent.

On the Israeli side, although discrepancies and shifts in positions have been less rapid and variable than those of their American counterparts, they have not been absent. Israeli objectives have ranged from completely eliminating the Iranian regime and “liberating” the Iranian people from it, to ensuring the total destruction of Iran’s military capabilities—particularly nuclear, ballistic, and air systems—so that Iran cannot threaten Israel in the future, and breaking the close alliance between Iran and allied groups in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq (Iran-aligned Shia armed factions), Yemen (the Houthi movement), and Palestine (Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups with fundamentalist Islamic orientations).

This brings us to the extent and clarity of the differences that have crystallized and become more apparent over time between U.S. and Israeli objectives in the war on Iran.

Thus, the current reading of American objectives in the war on Iran, a month into the conflict, indicates that the goal of overthrowing or fundamentally changing the existing regime in Tehran has significantly receded, and some even consider it to have disappeared. Objectives now focus on securing commitments and guarantees that Iran will not produce nuclear weapons, potentially moving toward curbing, if not dismantling, its nuclear program, and exerting pressure to gain concessions regarding its ballistic missile program, including range limitations at minimum. Finally, the objectives include obtaining Iranian commitments to halt, at least partially, its military, logistical, and training support to allied groups and organizations in the region, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, Islamist political groups in Palestine, and Iran-aligned armed Shia factions in Iraq, including the Kata'ib Hezbollah and Popular Mobilization Forces, among others.

On the Israeli side, the picture is slightly different. The Israeli government, under certain pressures from the current U.S. administration, may accept the American demands outlined at the end of the previous paragraph without considering the war over or any ceasefire final. This is due to repeated statements by senior Israeli officials throughout the war’s various stages, asserting that Israel views the very existence of the current regime in Tehran—with its declared positions against Israel—as a threat to the state’s survival itself, not merely to its security, regional integrity, or borders. Some, however, question the credibility of this claim, seeing it as motivated by Israel and its current political leadership’s desire to prevent other regional powers from emerging, coveting regional dominance to remain the sole regional authority—similar to the role of Iran under the Shah before 1979. The difference may be that Israel does not seek this role on behalf of another international actor, even the U.S., its closest and most vital ally, but rather for its own interests, aspiring to rise from being the sole regional power in the Middle East to becoming one of the major international powers, as stated by its Prime Minister.

We should observe what the coming days reveal regarding the widening or narrowing of the gap between American and Israeli objectives in the war on Iran. Yet, in both cases, it is important to reiterate what was stated at the beginning of this article: from a strategic perspective, and under the current administration in Washington and the government in Tel Aviv, any differences between the two countries remain secondary and subsidiary, not fundamental or core.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.