In America, Netanyahu bets on Trump’s need for a clear victory, while Iran wagers on raising the cost of resolution, turning the war from a short campaign into a long bargain. In fact, it works to convince Trump that he has won and to increase the cost of resolving the battle for America, whether in Hormuz or on the ground.

Iran does not need to completely close the strait; uncertainty, fear, and rising insurance costs suffice, with no alternative routes altering the crisis context. When the door narrows, windows do not replace it. Economic inflation (4% in Group of 20 economies during 2026) returns to center stage globally. The barrel does not remain a market commodity; it swiftly reaches the consumer’s pocket and the ballot boxes.

Theoretically, this stockpile could, if processed suitably, produce fissile material for more than ten bombs. Therefore, these bombs remain a project, but they make every truce temporary unless their file is closed.

History is not decoration, but a mirror of probabilities. In the tanker war of the 1980s, the United States began escorting re-flagged tankers under the American flag in Operation Earnest Will, then responded with Operation Praying Mantis in 1988 after the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine. The lesson was not that convoys are futile, but that Gulf geography gives coastal powers a perpetual ability to harass even against a superior navy. Narrow passages do not need enormous armies to become dangerous; the collapse of international law, a few mines, and small boats are enough.

In 1973 and 1974, oil didn’t stop forever, but the shock was enough to initially double the price, then nearly quadruple it, plunging the global economy into both inflation and recession. The U.S. Department of State and the Federal Reserve documented how that shock deepened existing imbalances and prompted governments to reconsider strategic reserves, fuel efficiency, and the limits of foreign dependence.

Iran is practically turning the Arab Gulf into an open focal point for international conflict: deterrence without trust, bargaining without agreements or peace, and maritime routes under the guns’ sway, with anxious markets. Meanwhile, Iran persists in its denial of its Arab neighborhood and blatant attacks!

In Washington, a different front opens up, seemingly less noisy. The internal debate over continuing the war is not, at its core, between war advocates and peace advocates.

Trump informed his aides that he wants to negotiate and avoid an “eternal war!” Vance embodies this hesitancy notably—the man known for his tendency to withdraw, to the extent that Trump himself described him as “less enthusiastic about striking Iran.” Rubio has become the voice of this organized concern, repeatedly emphasizing that the operation should be measured in weeks, not months, and that its goals can be achieved without ground forces.

The Pentagon works hard to narrow war goals. The hesitation extends beyond the political side to cold professional calculation: depleting precise ammunition, expanding deployment, and the fear that any move on the ground could lead to a new, unpleasant, and familiar version, recalling the smell of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.