Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Washington to meet with President Donald Trump less than a week after the U.S.–Iran meeting in Oman.

Netanyahu’s visit to the United States could indicate one of two things: either concern about a potential U.S.–Iran deal that does not meet all of Israel’s conditions, or the need for closer coordination in the coming period in light of a shared desire to confront the Islamic Republic militarily, if necessary.

U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner went to Muscat to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, after stopping in Israel, which these days seems determined not to limit its conditions solely to Iran abandoning its nuclear program.

Beyond the nuclear issue, there are two other conditions—Israeli rather than international. These relate to whether the Islamic Republic intends to act as a normal state within the region. They concern Iran’s ballistic missiles and their launch platforms, as well as Iranian behavior in the region, including the various militias affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard operating outside Iran, particularly in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

The nuclear issue, which Iran wants to restrict negotiations to, remains a topic of debate and is still negotiable. This is partly because Israeli and U.S. strikes in mid-June damaged a significant portion of Iran’s program. Israel targeted military sites as well as Iranian military and civilian figures, while U.S. bombers struck sites where uranium enrichment was taking place.

Does an American–Israeli disagreement explain Netanyahu’s rush to Washington? Clearly, the two sides are not fully aligned, especially since the Trump administration considers regional sentiment, primarily Arab and Turkish, which leans toward avoiding a U.S.–Israeli war with the Islamic Republic.

In fact, some in the region believe that a weakened Iran, with its regime at odds with its own people, has become a state in need of external support. The Islamic Republic no longer poses a threat to its near or distant neighbors. The Houthis in Yemen, who are merely an Iranian proxy, no longer launch missiles and drones toward mostly civilian sites in Saudi Arabia. Iran has finally begun to respect the Beijing Agreement, signed with Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023, which was mediated by China and restored diplomatic relations between the two countries while committing Iran to stop interfering in the internal affairs of others.

The situation in the region has changed dramatically—indeed, the region itself has transformed, following Iran’s wars on the sidelines of the Gaza conflict that erupted on October 7, 2023. Iran has lost influence in Syria and Lebanon and has suffered major setbacks in Yemen. It is not far-fetched to say that Iraq, which still represents Iran’s last leverage in the region, could be lost next.

Remarkably, Iranian officials continue to refuse to acknowledge what has happened in the region, the developments in Gaza, or the unrest within Iran itself. The region has changed, yet Tehran refuses to change its rhetoric, as if the events in Gaza and the aftermath of the Gaza war were mere incidents incapable of compelling the Islamic Republic to abandon its rigid language, a language rooted in the region’s past rather than its future.

This is not just about rigid rhetoric; it also concerns bets that have lost their purpose—strategies based on buying time or counting on a U.S.–Israeli disagreement. Any current disagreements remain merely formal and temporary, without affecting the core of the relationship between the Trump administration and Netanyahu.

For now, the Trump administration cannot confront the Israeli right except within certain limits that do not serve the Iranian regime or its ambitions. The reality is that Iran’s expansionist project in the region cannot be revived, regardless of U.S.–Israeli relations. This is confirmed by the fact that the U.S. envoys stopped in Israel on their way to Oman, and on their return, they visited the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln stationed in the Gulf. This clearly shows that today, power shapes U.S. policy and Israel is an inseparable part of that American power.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar