Since the end of the Second World War, the international peace and security system has been organized primarily around the United Nations and the Charter-based authority of the Security Council. Despite longstanding debates over effectiveness, selectivity, and power asymmetries, this system has historically rested on three core assumptions: the centrality of international law, the continuity of multilateral institutions, and the legitimacy derived from collective state consent. Developments observed during the 2025–2026 period, particularly during the second administration of Donald Trump, have prompted renewed scholarly attention to these assumptions. Rather than reflecting a simple decline in institutional relevance, these developments raise broader questions about the possible reconfiguration of global peace governance.

One way to conceptualize recent U.S. policy toward the United Nations is through the framework of institutional retrenchment. In this context, retrenchment does not necessarily imply outright withdrawal or rejection of multilateralism, but rather a strategic recalibration of institutional engagement, including reductions in financial commitments, operational scope, and normative ambition. Official discourse frequently framed this approach as a renewed focus on the United Nations’ original mandate of maintaining international peace and security, suggesting that the organization had expanded into areas beyond its core competencies.

At the operational level, this recalibration coincided with proposals to reassess the scale and duration of certain long-standing peace operations, including missions in Lebanon and Kosovo, as well as decisions to suspend or delay previously authorized financial contributions. These measures had tangible budgetary implications for the organization, contributing to liquidity constraints and administrative pressures within the UN system. The launch of the “UN80” initiative by Secretary-General António Guterres, which included staff reductions and budgetary consolidation, can be understood less as a comprehensive reform agenda than as an adaptive response to these constraints. From an institutional perspective, this episode highlighted the extent to which multilateral organizations remain structurally dependent on the fiscal and political decisions of major contributors.

Beyond financial retrenchment, recent years have also witnessed experimentation with alternative models of peace operations that partially externalize security management from the UN Secretariat. The international response to the security crisis in Haiti illustrates this evolving approach. While formally authorized by the Security Council, operational leadership and force generation were delegated to a coalition of partner states, with the United Nations playing a more limited coordinating and legitimizing role. This model did not replace UN peacekeeping, but it did suggest a growing openness to hybrid arrangements in which multilateral legitimacy and operational control are increasingly decoupled.

It is within this broader environment of institutional experimentation that proposals such as the Board of Peace have emerged. Initially presented in early 2026 within the context of initiatives aimed at de-escalating the Gaza conflict, the Board of Peace was subsequently articulated as a standing mechanism for addressing international security challenges outside the traditional UN framework. From an analytical standpoint, the significance of this proposal lies less in its immediate operational impact than in what it signals about evolving conceptions of authority, legitimacy, and participation in global governance.

The institutional design of the Board of Peace departs from the principles underpinning the UN Charter. Whereas the United Nations is based on the formal equality of sovereign states, the Board introduces a differentiated model of participation that places considerable emphasis on financial contribution and political alignment.

The period under review has been marked by a broader reassessment of U.S. engagement with the UN system as a whole. Accumulated arrears in assessed contributions, alongside decisions to withdraw from or suspend funding to various UN-affiliated bodies, have reinforced debates about burden-sharing, institutional effectiveness, and national sovereignty. In specific contexts, such as humanitarian assistance in Gaza, alternative governance arrangements involving ad hoc committees and private-sector actors have been proposed as complements or substitutes to established UN agencies. These developments reflect ongoing tensions between multilateral norms and more managerial or results-oriented approaches to international intervention.

Normatively, the contrast between the United Nations and emerging alternative frameworks highlights a wider debate within international relations. The UN system, notwithstanding its limitations, remains anchored in a discourse of universal rights, civilian protection, and international humanitarian law. Newer initiatives, including the Board of Peace, tend to prioritize pragmatism, negotiation, and outcome-oriented management, often with less explicit reference to legal or normative constraints. Whether this represents an erosion of established norms or an adaptation to changing geopolitical realities remains an open question for scholars and practitioners alike.

International reactions to these developments have been mixed. Some states have expressed interest in participating in alternative forums as a means of preserving influence within a shifting global landscape, while others have reaffirmed their commitment to the UN Charter as the primary legal foundation for international peace and security. Statements by European and Latin American governments, as well as by UN leadership, underscore the persistence of competing visions regarding the future of global governance.

Taken together, recent trends suggest not a sudden displacement of the United Nations, but a period of pluralization in peace and security governance. Institutional retrenchment, hybrid operational models, and experimental alternatives coexist with, rather than fully replace, the established multilateral system. The central analytical challenge is therefore not to assess the success or failure of any single institution, but to understand how these parallel structures may reshape the meaning, practice, and legitimacy of peace in an increasingly fragmented international order.