The general trajectory of the formation of “Hezbollah,” although it originally falls within the framework of Islamic movements, is not different from totalitarian parties such as the Communist Party that ruled the former Soviet Union, or the Baath Party in both its Syrian and Iraqi branches, or the clerical regime in Iran, or even far right parties that established totalitarian ideological systems in the West.

This is based on the idea that the expression of ideology, style, positions, and policies becomes a single verbal formula repeatedly echoed by all party members and supporters with absolutely no differentiation.

However, what can be considered a “specificity” that Hezbollah has recently added to its resemblance with parties moving toward extinction is that it has sought to turn obscene expression, extremely violent and vulgar at the same time, into an offensive tool that fills the vacuum of a confused decision suspended between an internal sedition action that has become almost impossible and a rolling military action that is constrained by obstacles and red lines.

A quick review of the course of developments that preceded the signing of the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel on 26 June last in Washington, and after its signing, shows that the party’s discourse, voiced by its MPs, its secretary general, and the politicians within its sphere and within the sphere of declining Iranian influence, has since the emergence of the Hezbollah phenomenon in Lebanon always been saturated with tendencies of violence and hatred toward opponents, based on generalizing hostility toward Israel to include most others among fellow citizens. Yet this discourse has, this time, reached its peak level of exposure.

This phenomenon does not only reflect the level of tension and strain that characterizes Hezbollah's reaction to a Lebanese state that shocked it in an unexpected way by confronting the core of its function as an arm that summons wars with Israel and becomes involved in all regional conflicts in favor of Iran. It also shows that the level of contempt and insults directed at the President, the Prime Minister, and the forces supporting the state and the option of negotiation with Israel largely reflects an “alternative of the lost.”

That lost one has gone and will not return, and has lost its sense of direction, and worse still, has gone astray while raising slogans of victory over the “Great Satan,” while that same actor is exchanging with Iran the condemned act that “Hezbollah” itself criminalizes in Lebanon.

The issue of sedition and civil war, which the party has persistently reproduced in its habitual pattern since the “good old days,” the days of its now defunct patronage during the era of the joint Syrian and Iranian tutelage, and throughout many years after the withdrawal of Bashar al Assad’s regime forces from Lebanon, this phenomenon favored by the party has now been firmly established as part of its past record and nothing more.

Today, realities have emerged that make it almost impossible for it to even evoke any of its “shameful experiences,” especially as the party overuses the term shame and projects it onto the framework agreement, the state authority, and its opponents as “agents” of Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

There is no secret in the fact that sedition will not return as long as all of Lebanon, with all its forces, has long moved beyond the era of strife, and as long as internal wars find no one to glorify them except those who exaggerate their threat, thereby revealing their own inability and incapacity to bring back a doomed past that will not return.

Even Hezbollah itself, in its excessive reliance on a discourse of hostility and hatred, reveals that its latest ongoing wars have become impossible to repeat going forward, because neither its remaining capabilities will allow for further wars, nor will the conditions of the ongoing settlements with its Iranian patron leave room for wars, nor will the Lebanese state, its political and social forces, including most of the community affected by its wars, allow any longer for the wars of others to be conducted through the party.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar