Israel and Iran have reportedly agreed on efforts to undermine any potential agreement between the Lebanese state and Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not accept the direct negotiation initiative announced by President Joseph Aoun last March. He only agreed to move forward with it under direct and public pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump.

If official Israeli statements now describe the agreement with Lebanon as historic, this amounts to deceptive diplomacy that conceals Netanyahu and his government’s reluctance to reach an agreement that would end the war in Lebanon.

Iran also opposes this agreement. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps signaled its rejection before Hezbollah, followed by Iranian official channels in Tehran issuing a corresponding public stance. Since the early 1980s, Iran has invested significant financial, military, political, and diplomatic resources in strengthening its allied party in Lebanon and consolidating its influence.

From this perspective, its objective has been to maintain strategic leverage over southern Lebanon and the eastern Mediterranean, and it is unlikely to accept the emergence of an independent Lebanese decision-making authority that limits its influence in the south and along the coast.

The Framework Agreement

Iran and its allied party effectively undermined the agreement before it could even take shape, rejecting the idea of Lebanon forming a negotiating delegation, similar to other frameworks, to engage with what they describe as the “lesser Satan” in order to secure a full withdrawal and establish full state sovereignty over its borders.

This opposition was expressed through anger, condemnation, and assertive rhetoric, even as Iran simultaneously engages in direct negotiations with the “greater Satan” to deter attacks, manage tensions, and pursue outcomes framed in terms of peace, cooperation, investment, and coexistence. While Tehran discusses the details of agreements through calculated, transactional diplomacy, its Lebanese ally avoids engaging with the clauses of the framework agreement itself, which many also view as weak and in need of revision and improvement, with obstruction instead taking place through the execution of directives rather than open negotiation or debate over terms.

Hezbollah’s ally, Nabih Berri, did not follow the same approach as the party itself. He refrained from issuing premature judgments against the agreement originating from Tehran. Instead, and beyond his political and partisan considerations, he acted in his capacity as head of the legislative authority, where rejection, at a minimum, is expected to conform to established norms and principles.

He waited several days, which appeared to reflect a period of assessment and evaluation, before rejecting the agreement on the grounds that it was worse than the 1983 agreement and not aligned with the Arab context governing relations with Israel.

Tehran, meanwhile, expressed satisfaction following a call from the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who may have sought to influence Riyadh by framing its peace initiative as both a ceiling for Lebanon and a baseline for future political maneuvering.

Secrecy surrounding the Agreement's 'security annex'

However, this remains only a “framework agreement,” behind which lies a long and complex path of negotiations. It will inevitably intersect with regional and international interests, particularly those of the United States, and will also be shaped by the broader outcomes of any agreement, or lack thereof, with Iran.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.