In normal phases of history, small countries can postpone difficult decisions and live within existing balances of power. However, in exceptional periods—when regional power structures shift rapidly, when one system is declining while another is emerging—small states face a harsh test: either they adapt to the new reality or risk becoming subjects of decisions made elsewhere. Lebanon is now approaching such a sensitive moment.

It may be premature to speak of a “new Sykes-Picot” in the literal sense, but the Middle East is clearly undergoing a phase of redistribution of influence and a reordering of security and political priorities. In such moments, weak states and fragile institutions become more exposed to decisions shaped beyond their borders. This raises a central question: where does Lebanon stand in this new equation?

It is evident that Israel views the aftermath of its latest war from a broader strategic perspective that goes beyond a purely military confrontation. It seeks to achieve two parallel objectives: first, to end or significantly reduce Hezbollah’s independent military capacity to the point where it no longer poses a threat to Israeli security; and second, if conditions permit, to move toward a more stable relationship with the Lebanese state, potentially including security and border arrangements and possibly new forms of political understanding in the future.

However, achieving these objectives is far from simple. Hezbollah is not merely a military force; over decades, it has become part of the Iranian regional system, while also being deeply rooted within Lebanese society. As a result, any attempt to impose rapid and radical change could carry the risk of internal fragmentation or confrontation—outcomes that many Lebanese, exhausted by successive economic and political crises, would prefer to avoid.

On the other hand, Washington is focused on closing one of the most complex files in the Arab East. From its perspective, the existence of an armed force outside the authority of the Lebanese state represents an obstacle to building a more stable regional order. This is why ideas have emerged suggesting a potential Syrian role in addressing the Lebanese issue or contributing to limiting or preventing the rebuilding of Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

A Chance and a Test at the Same Time

At the same time, this vision collides with a different reality. The new Syria is not Assad’s Syria, and the current regime is preoccupied with major internal challenges linked to rebuilding state institutions and achieving economic and security stability. It therefore does not appear to have the practical capacity or political willingness to enter a complex Lebanese entanglement that could drain its limited resources or revive crises it has only just begun to overcome. Meanwhile, the Lebanese state itself stands between both opportunity and test. A wide segment of Lebanese society wants the state to regain its natural role and monopolize the decision of war and peace. In addition, severe economic pressures have pushed large parts of society to favor stability and institutional reconstruction over involvement in volatile regional conflicts.

Yet the Iranian factor remains the most complicated element in the equation. It is difficult to imagine Tehran easily relinquishing an influence it has invested in for decades, both financially and through political and security means. A complete withdrawal from Hezbollah could be interpreted within its allied environment as an admission of defeat in a broader regional project. For this reason, Iran may seek to preserve some form of political or security influence that maintains its foothold in future regional arrangements and sustains its standing among its allies.

Moreover, Tehran views the Lebanese file in a broader context that extends beyond Lebanon itself. For Iran, Lebanon has also been a platform for influence in other countries through recruitment or training of Iran-aligned groups, making it difficult to accept the loss of this leverage without some form of political exchange. As a result, the coming phase may witness attempts to shift from direct military influence toward alternative forms of political influence.

At the same time, the international community does not appear willing to accept a return to the previous status quo. Recent wars and their human and economic costs have led many actors to conclude that the old framework has reached its limits. Accordingly, international pressure on various Lebanese parties is likely to continue in the direction of more stable arrangements.

Three Scenarios

From this situation, three main scenarios can be envisaged. First, a gradual success of the Lebanese state in restoring its authority with Arab and international support, leading to a phased transformation of Hezbollah into a civilian political force. Second, the continuation of the current situation in a modified form, allowing limited influence for the party while imposing greater constraints on its military capabilities. Third, the least stable scenario: the collapse of any settlement, pushing Lebanon into a prolonged phase of confrontation among competing foreign powers.

The first scenario is the most beneficial for Lebanon, but it requires internal consensus and substantial external economic support. The second scenario is the most realistic in the short term, as it allows all parties to preserve face and avoid a comprehensive confrontation. The third scenario carries significant risks, as it would prolong the crisis, delay economic recovery, and turn Lebanon into an open arena for external conflicts.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.