From now, it seems useful to examine the post-signing phase of the American–Iranian memorandum of understanding, which appears to have clear backing from several regional powers, including Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt.

How Iran will engage with neighboring Arab countries, despite the theoretically positive relations it has established with them in recent years across multiple levels, remains an open question. It is not unlikely that Tehran’s historically condescending perception of these states will persist.

The “Islamic Republic” has not refrained from acts of hostility toward any of the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, viewing them as part of the American–Israeli campaign against it. This dynamic has culminated in the anticipated signing of the memorandum in the coming days—unless unforeseen developments intervene.

The central issue surrounding the memorandum is the assumption that Iran, a regime founded on the principle of “exporting the revolution,” can return to being a normal state within the regional system, rather than one that derives leverage from pressuring its neighbors and the wider international community.

Such an outcome remains difficult to foresee, particularly given the belief that the “Islamic Republic” can hardly be anything other than a state pursuing dominance, whether directly or indirectly—directly through its diplomatic missions and networks involving Revolutionary Guards officers, or indirectly through allied groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Emergence of Prominent Faces and Voices

In the period leading up to the announcement of the memorandum, there was a noticeable rise in media figures appearing on prominent Arab television channels. These Iranian, and at times non-Iranian, commentators assumed the role of defending the “Islamic Republic” and its policies, including Hezbollah, in ways that could at best be described as crude.

This occurred while the “Islamic Republic” was openly criticizing countries such as Kuwait, which appears to have unresolved historical grievances. It was striking to see these voices defending Iranian policy from within various Arab capitals. This raises the question of whether understandings in the media sphere have been reached between regional states and Iran as part of the preparatory phase for the American–Iranian memorandum.

Many questions remain unanswered, particularly with the appearance on one satellite channel of a so-called media figure or researcher from Iraq discussing Hezbollah and its historical relationship with Israel. There was a clear emphasis among these television “faces” on the history of Lebanon’s relations with Israel and alleged “Zionist ambitions” in Lebanon since the first Arab–Israeli war in 1948.

A common feature among these commentators was a disregard for established facts, relying instead on questionable interpretations. Among these claims was the assertion that Israel destroyed Lebanon’s civilian aviation fleet at Beirut Airport in the late 1960s, referring to Middle East Airlines and Lebanese International Airways, whose aircraft were parked at the airport and were destroyed one by one.

Iranian Narrative: an Ignorance of Reality

Iranian and non-Iranian commentators alike appeared to consistently ignore the broader context, including the fact that the Israeli strike on Beirut Airport did not occur in isolation. It followed repeated Israeli warnings that the state would not allow Beirut Airport to be used as a launch point for aircraft hijackings targeting Israeli planes in Europe.

Rather than treating these warnings seriously, and instead of Lebanese political authorities addressing the seriousness of the situation, Parliament proceeded to approve the Cairo Agreement in November 1969. Under this agreement, Lebanese authorities effectively relinquished control over parts of their territory, marking what some describe as the beginning of a prolonged cycle of instability that continues to this day.

There is no need to revisit other historical facts that risk being distorted in order to serve a specific Iranian narrative. This narrative is based on the idea that Lebanon is engaged in “resistance” against Israel, and that the “Islamic Republic” came to Lebanon solely to support this “resistance.”

From now on, it appears necessary to challenge these interpretations, which are presented as balanced “opinion and counter-opinion.” A key question remains: where is the Arab and Gulf voice within Iran itself, where even the Iranian public has limited space for expression?

Whatever the outcome of the American–Iranian memorandum, there is a growing need in the Gulf to prepare for the post-conflict phase that is expected to emerge.

Media preparedness appears to be an essential part of this upcoming stage, which may reshape regional balances, particularly if a faction within the Trump administration, led by Vice President J.D. Vance, comes to view the “Islamic Republic” as having entered a more pragmatic or rational phase in some form.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.