U.S.–Iran agreement in Geneva triggers new regional tracks and redraws Lebanon equation
As implementation begins over 60 days, a dual-track process involving major regional powers and Iran reshapes security talks, while Lebanon emerges as a key but tightly constrained arena under a set of political “no’s” that define the next phase.
With the final face-to-face signing of the U.S.-Iran agreement in Geneva on Friday, celebrations and competing interpretations of victory claimed by both sides of the conflict have come to an end.
This marks the beginning of a more realistic reading of the agreement, whose terms remain undisclosed, and the start of implementation mechanisms extending over 60 days.
These will serve as a true test of the agreement’s durability first, and of the feasibility of its execution and the commitment of its parties second.
Information emerging from behind the scenes suggests that implementation will begin on Saturday, unfolding along more than one track. In addition to the U.S.-Iran track, which is exclusively concerned with the interests of both countries and focuses on three priorities—the nuclear issue, freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, lifting sanctions on Tehran, and releasing its financial assets—a parallel regional track on regional security will also begin.
Major countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan will take part in this track, engaging in dialogue with Iran on the future of the region and how to reintegrate Iran into the Sunni-majority regional framework, following the expansion of Iranian influence there.
According to the information, this track is expected to begin its activities in the Kingdom in its first meeting on Monday, aiming to discuss the Sunni-Shia situation and prevent any future attempts to destabilize it, amid significant fears of U.S. and Israeli encouragement of such dynamics, which began to surface following Iranian attacks on Gulf countries and the latter’s refusal to engage in war.
This track takes on a regional aspect with a Sunni orientation rather than a purely Gulf one, especially as some Gulf countries such as Oman, the UAE, and Qatar are excluded from it. Washington seeks to participate in these meetings, but Iran completely rejects this.
With the launch of these two tracks addressing the repercussions of war, questions arise about Lebanon’s position and Israel’s current refusal to comply with what the Islamabad agreement commits it to regarding the ceasefire in Lebanon. An Arab ambassador in Lebanon, who declined to be identified, stated that Lebanon will be a key item on the agenda of the Arab-Iranian track, noting that this issue will crystallize during the fifth round of Lebanon’s negotiations with Israel in Washington. New ideas will be proposed at the table aimed at achieving a breakthrough or progress in solidifying the ceasefire and ensuring the commencement of Israeli withdrawal.
Before discussing the new ideas to be deliberated, the ambassador affirms a set of “no’s” that will govern the Lebanese scene in the coming stage. The first is that there will be no disarmament of Hezbollah under any pretext after the Islamabad agreement, which will strengthen Iran’s hold over its Lebanese arm after acknowledging its loss of its Yemeni and Iraqi arms, despite Iran’s massive investments in the party over the past four decades to achieve what it has today.
This means that the Lebanese authorities and friendly countries concerned with the country will need to find a formula or mechanism that strips the weapons of their functional military nature, limiting them solely to confronting Israel, recognizing that this will face significant challenges and will not be easy to address.
This leads to the second “no”: there will be no Israeli withdrawal in the foreseeable future from the occupied Lebanese territories, necessitating perhaps a return to a step-by-step policy, with trial areas serving as models in this context to activate implementation mechanisms for withdrawal, possibly linked to the formation of a multinational force currently under consideration.
Conversely, the Arab ambassador does not foresee the party pushing to topple the government, leading to a third “no”—no change of government, which was a target of the recent Saudi movement. There is a Saudi-Iranian understanding on this issue, which also includes avoiding the descent of the Lebanese arena into civil war.
The ambassador reveals that the entry of the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri into direct negotiations with Washington, presenting a proposal to be discussed in forthcoming negotiation meetings, reflects the party’s engagement in negotiations alongside U.S. involvement, increasing the chances of reaching an understanding under the title of halting hostilities between Lebanon and Israel.