The Americans are promoting the “memorandum of understanding” as an “agreement” that serves their interests, while Donald Trump presents it as proof of his “victory,” crediting it not to diplomatic efforts but to a series of military achievements: destroying naval forces, air defenses, missile factories, and drones, with the naval blockade becoming the decisive factor that pushed the Iranian negotiator toward necessary concessions.

On the other hand, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz compelled the American negotiator to soften his conditions. Even if Trump appeared to dismiss the energy supply crisis, satisfied with the profits made by American companies from oil price fluctuations, he still became internationally accountable for an internal economic crisis in the United States, which pressured him to “end the war.”

Ending the war was the first condition set by Tehran before the mediators, alongside demands for “guarantees against resuming hostilities” and “compensations” for the damages it suffered.

A ceasefire was therefore reached as an initial truce, followed by a negotiation session in Islamabad, which was concluded by the U.S. Vice President, who stated he had not received an “assured commitment from the Iranian side not to acquire a nuclear weapon.”

Nevertheless, negotiations continued with the Pakistani mediator, though with difficulties, leading Trump to threaten the destruction of Iranian energy stations, bridges, and oil installations, before halting operations and extending the truce. Eventually, Tehran provided that “commitment,” and both sides agreed to postpone the nuclear issue to separate negotiations.

The complexity then shifted to other issues, including the lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen assets. There was no difficulty in easing sanctions on Iranian oil exports, while other sanctions were tied to “Iran’s performance.”

The proposed conditional arrangement for the “installment” release of restricted funds was initially rejected by Iran before being improved. The issue of reopening the Strait of Hormuz remained unresolved, as Tehran sought U.S. recognition of its oversight of the strait and the imposition of transit fees.

However, escalating tensions and Trump’s threats of resuming hostilities, which risked collapsing the truce, led Iran to step back and freeze the issue of transit fees during nuclear negotiations. As a result, the “Islamabad Agreement” was announced, though it still required final adjustments before completion.

Signing complications then emerged, possibly because Trump sought to bring together in Islamabad the 11 countries he claimed had agreed to the deal, including Israel (which had not actually agreed), before it was ultimately decided to sign it “electronically” or “remotely.”

Memorandum of Understanding or Temporary Agreement?

In any case, this remains only a “memorandum of understanding,” or a “temporary agreement,” as described by Abbas Araghchi. This document may solidify the end of a war in which the American side identified numerous flaws in planning and execution, as well as weaknesses in strategic goal-setting, including over-reliance on Israel as a partner.

However, it may also prolong the conflict in a more limited form than a full-scale war, either by keeping Iran under long-term sanctions or because its capabilities have been weakened and exposed.

The Iranian side may be led to believe that its negotiating performance constituted a “victory” in a war it views as an imposed aggression rather than the result of four decades of accumulated mistakes. Iran’s narrative suggests it emerged stronger after confronting the United States, as Araghchi stated. It is fair to ask: stronger against whom, and for what purpose?

The Arab-Islamic Role

Five Arab-Islamic countries sought to stop the war, playing a crucial role in preserving the truce across three stages, and contributing, along with regional support, to reaching the “agreement,” excluding Israel, which is expected to continue undermining and failing it. After this complex and bitter experience, both the United States and Iran will focus on nuclear negotiations, which require genuine political will to overcome obstacles and resolve this file.

These Arab-Islamic countries must closely monitor these negotiations, as the “Iranian nuclear” issue, although still a threat, no longer justifies the extortion practiced by Americans and Israelis. Instead, the “post-nuclear” phase is what concerns everyone, involving the region’s future and stability. Both regional expansions—Israeli and Iranian—require consideration of a “power distribution” or sharing arrangement, under U.S. oversight.

Prior to and following the U.S.-Iranian “agreement,” leaks suggest that each side views it as beneficial. Iran succeeded in separating concessions from its missile program, while the United States did not decisively prioritize the “arms” dossier, as it was stated that the “agreement prohibits Iran from financing terrorist groups,” without specifying a binding commitment.

The Iranian side emphasized that the ceasefire includes Lebanon and “also implies Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories,” with the United States overseeing dealings with Israel. A ceasefire may therefore be achieved, but withdrawal remains another matter.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.