Iraq yesterday, Lebanon today: Iran’s regional strategy and the Gulf’s lost trust

Opinion 10-06-2026 | 08:41

Iraq yesterday, Lebanon today: Iran’s regional strategy and the Gulf’s lost trust

Has anything changed between 2003 and 2026? Does the United States now have a strategy to confront the Iranian strategy, which has negative repercussions on a country like Lebanon and on the Gulf Cooperation Council states?

Iraq yesterday, Lebanon today: Iran’s regional strategy and the Gulf’s lost trust
The “Islamic Republic” has not, since its establishment in 1979, abandoned the slogan of “exporting the revolution” (Agence France-Presse).
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Iran considers that its presence in Lebanon secures its control over Lebanon’s national decision making, and that it is an integral part of its ability to hold leverage in negotiations with the United States.

 

It also appears that the attacks it carries out against Arab Gulf states fall within this same strategy, a strategy of accumulating leverage. This is a strategy that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun explicitly referred to in his recent interview with CNN. The Lebanese president was very clear when he said that it is not acceptable for Lebanon to be used as a bargaining chip between Iran and the United States.

 

From Lebanon to the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Iranian strategy appears to be completely clear. However, this does not prevent us from asking what the future of the relationship between Iran and its Arab neighbors will look like, if we set aside Iraq. What will the future of Iranian Gulf relations be on the day after the current war ends?

 

It is certain that Iran, regardless of the circumstances of its relationship with Lebanon, has lost the trust of the six Arab Gulf states that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It has become clear that all the statements issued in the past from Tehran regarding cooperation to counter external interference and to build an independent regional policy free from blocs have nothing to do with reality or truth in any way. They were merely Iranian rhetoric meant to mislead and obscure the facts.

 

It has also become clear that everything Iran seeks is dominance over the region and making the center of regional decision making in Tehran. This reflects nothing but ignorance of the nature of the Gulf Cooperation Council states on one hand, and disregard for their awareness of Iran’s true intentions on the other.

 

Beyond that, it has also become clear that the Islamic Republic has not abandoned since its establishment in 1979 the slogan of exporting the revolution, meaning exporting the revolution to neighboring countries.

 

It initially failed to do so. This was due to Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which despite all its atrocities and political miscalculations acted as a barrier preventing Iranian expansion in Iraq itself and in the region. It should not be overlooked that Iraq fought an eight-year war with Iran. The war ended in 1988 when Ayatollah Khomeini was forced to describe his acceptance of the ceasefire as “drinking the cup of poison.”

 

However, the United States soon effectively handed Iraq over to the Islamic Republic of Iran on a silver platter. It overturned the regional balance completely. In practical terms, the administration of George W. Bush gave Iran the green light to infiltrate Iraq. In the end, the sectarian Iraqi militias that had fought the Iraqi army for eight years returned to Baghdad from Tehran. They returned to the Iraqi capital on an American tank.

 

Has the United States learned anything from the lesson of handing Iraq over to Iran? It is still difficult to answer this question. Much will depend on how the current war between the United States and the Islamic Republic unfolds, a conflict that is sometimes intense and at other times accompanied by talk of a ceasefire. Will this war end in a deal? What will the nature of that deal be? Will the Gulf states be aware of it and its details or not?

 

What is certain is that the nature of any agreement sought by Donald Trump will be significant not only for the future of relations between Tehran and Washington, but also for Iran-Gulf relations.

 

In 2003, the Iranian expansion project began anew, with Iraq as its starting point. This expansion then spread in all directions, with a particular focus on Lebanon, where Hezbollah assassinated Rafic Hariri in order to eliminate any hope of restoring Lebanon’s recovery and its return to the Middle East map.

 

The assassination of Hariri paved the way for full Iranian control over Lebanon, especially after the Syrian army was forced to end its occupation of the country.

 

From now on, despite all the complexities surrounding ongoing contacts aimed at reaching a US Iranian deal, there are fears of an American underestimation of the importance of putting an end to the Iranian strategy based on the idea of extortion. Extortion of Lebanon and of every Arab Gulf state.

 

Has anything changed between 2003 and 2026? Does the United States now have a strategy to confront the Iranian strategy, which has negative repercussions on a country like Lebanon and on the Gulf Cooperation Council states?

 

 

 

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.