It is unlikely that Iran will be able to deprive Lebanon of its sovereign right to conduct negotiations with Israel, even if it sought to demonstrate through its targeting of Israel two days ago, described as a response to the targeting of Beirut's southern suburbs, renewed attempts to keep Lebanon under its strategic umbrella by turning it into a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the United States and by sending a message that it has not abandoned the defense of its regional proxies.

Repeating the experience of the Syrian regime, which dominated Lebanon for three decades in this regard, appears unlikely and is now approaching impossibility in light of regional, international, and even Lebanese circumstances that have changed fundamentally.

Syrian control was justified, at least, by the Lebanese authorities' coerced consent or tacit complicity in refraining from acting beyond the limits set by Syria and its negotiations. The Iranian regime lacks such conditions and has entered into a direct confrontation with the Lebanese state in an attempt to strip it of its sovereign authority to determine its own course, under the pretext of protecting Lebanon, even though Lebanon rejects that protection.

However, what Iran may succeed in doing, just as Syria did in the past, is slowing the implementation of any agreements that may be reached by linking them to the pace of its own negotiations, thereby preserving its ability to exert either positive or negative influence.

Diplomatic sources hold no illusions that Iran will cease trying fiercely to defend its investment in Lebanon, embodied by Hezbollah over the course of decades, while simultaneously using Lebanon to send messages to both Israel and the United States regarding its readiness to deter any future military action against its proxies by increasing the cost of escalation. Iran has benefited from this approach in light of the US President's insistence on setting war aside and his pressure on Israel to prevent it from completing its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In reality, Iran, which was "provoked" by the recent shelling of the southern suburbs and rushed to defend it, was neither provoked by Israel's shelling of southern villages and towns and the Israeli army's incursions over the past months, even after Iran’s missile deterrence messages following the shelling of the suburbs.

This point raises questions about whether the Iranian zeal to defend the suburbs is connected to the presence of the "Revolutionary Guard" headquarters now managing the party, and the deterrence of Israel is for its protection, complete with all the propaganda tools to assure the Shia community that they can rely on Iran and its support. Iran can no longer wage a war to defend itself amid the challenges it faces domestically. However, it still spreads the "illusion of power" in the required directions.

The positive aspect of the Lebanese Israeli negotiations, particularly in their most recent round, lies in the fact that they are the result of a decision that Lebanon’s official authorities have firmly taken without Iran’s ability to influence it. In addition, they are now imposing a fait accompli that Iran cannot undo.

Instead, the "Shiite duo" must adapt to it, even if it tries to request amendments or interpretations that would justify for it a role and perhaps gains that save face. This comes after it refused to participate in the delegation when the President of the Republic proposed forming a diverse negotiating team in Washington.

The political outbidding over the Lebanese delegation is not directed only at its professionalism but is also an attempt to compete with the President of the Republic himself over who holds decision making authority in Lebanon, based on the claim that he is not the one deciding on the ongoing war, while his delegation is working to salvage what can be salvaged.

However, these sources do not believe that Iran will stop trying to impose its presence in Lebanon, as it remains determined to defend what is left of its influence there after its loss in Syria, a development that could represent an additional critical setback for it.

At the same time, there will eventually come a point when Lebanon will need to open a dialogue with Iran, but only after Iran undergoes a fundamental transformation that leads it to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and authority, instead of imposing control over it or overstepping against its officials.

According to these sources, Iran’s ability to deprive Lebanon of its negotiations would only be halted if it succeeds in blackmailing US President Donald Trump, and consequently if the United States continues to refuse to grant Iran this card in its own negotiations, thereby maintaining a separation between the two tracks despite Iran’s ongoing maneuvers, which are unlikely to stop. An equally important element is Israel’s interest in eventually ending hostilities with Lebanon and reaching peace at some point.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.