If the Strait of Hormuz is the Gulf’s “oil and gas valve,” then Bab al-Mandab is the “trade gateway” between Asia and Europe.

Therefore, closing them does not have the same economic impact, even though both lie at the heart of the same geopolitical crisis.

The key difference is that Hormuz directly hits energy supplies, while Bab al-Mandab affects transport costs and supply chains, and it could turn into an even larger oil shock if it is closed while the Strait of Hormuz remains shut.

What passes through Bab al-Mandab?

Through Hormuz passes the oil of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, Qatar, and Iran, in addition to a highly significant share of liquefied natural gas trade, especially from Qatar.

According to data from the US Energy Information Administration, oil and petroleum product flows through Hormuz reached about 20.9 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, representing more than a quarter of global maritime oil trade and about one fifth of global consumption of petroleum liquids. Around 11.4 billion cubic feet per day of liquefied natural gas also passed through it, representing more than 20 percent of global LNG trade.

Therefore, closing Hormuz does not only increase transport costs, but removes massive volumes from the market, affecting Asia first, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea being the main destinations for these shipments.

As for Bab al-Mandab, located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, it connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and is part of the Suez Canal route. Before the escalation of Houthi attacks, it was a vital passage for oil moving from the Gulf to Europe and the United States, as well as for container shipping between Asia and Europe.

However, its oil volume is much smaller than that of Hormuz. Data from the Energy Information Administration shows that oil flows through Bab al-Mandab reached 9.3 million barrels per day in 2023, then dropped to 4.1 million in 2024 and 4.2 million in the first half of 2025, after many companies diverted ships around the Cape of Good Hope.

The greater importance of Bab al-Mandab lies in general trade. Before the crisis, the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Bab al-Mandab route carried about 30 percent of global container trade, according to the World Bank.

This includes many goods, most notably electronics and phones and spare parts from Asia to Europe, as well as clothing, textiles, furniture, industrial machinery and equipment, cars and auto parts, food products, grains, oils and consumer goods, chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, and production inputs.

How does each passage have its own type of crisis?

Here the fundamental difference becomes clear: closing Hormuz means a supply crisis in energy, while closing Bab al-Mandab usually means a crisis of routes, higher costs, and delays. A ship avoiding Bab al-Mandab and the Suez Canal can detour around southern Africa, but it pays a higher price in fuel, insurance, and time.

However, a ship leaving the Gulf through Hormuz has no real maritime alternative unless the exporting country has a pipeline that bypasses the strait.

Saudi Arabia has built for years the East West pipeline that transports crude from the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea. In 2026, Saudi Arabia announced that the pipeline had returned to full capacity at about 7 million barrels per day, roughly 70 percent of its usual daily exports.

In practice, not all of this volume becomes direct exports, because part of it goes to refineries and facilities in the western part of the Kingdom, but the pipeline gives Riyadh room for maneuver, which it has enhanced by creating a land transport network linking different Gulf countries to the Red Sea.

However, if Bab al-Mandab is also closed or Red Sea ports come under attack, this alternative itself comes under threat.

Yemeni fishing boats on the Yemeni coast of the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait. (AFP)

For this reason, closing Bab al-Mandab after the closure of Hormuz is more dangerous than closing it on its own. During the Red Sea crisis between 2023 and 2025, Gulf exports were still able to pass through Hormuz, and the main problem was that ships avoided the Red Sea and instead sailed around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa.

Today, however, with Hormuz remaining disrupted, the Red Sea is no longer just a trade route but a vital alternative artery for Saudi oil exports. In that case, Bab al-Mandab is no longer a logistical detail; it becomes a second energy choke point.

What is the difference in economic impact?

The impact on markets differs. Hormuz is immediately reflected in oil and gas prices because the market fears an actual physical shortage in supply.

Any major drop in Gulf exports increases the risk premium on Brent crude and pushes importing countries, especially in Asia, to draw on reserves or seek more expensive alternatives from the United States, West Africa, and Latin America. It also pressures LNG markets, since Qatar cannot export its liquefied gas without passing through Hormuz.

Bab al-Mandab, by contrast, hits container shipping and general trade more heavily. According to the World Bank, in its discussion of the Red Sea crisis, the Suez–Bab al-Mandab route carried about 30 percent of global container trade, and ship traffic through the Suez and Bab al-Mandab declined sharply as attacks expanded.

Shipping costs rose, delivery schedules were disrupted, and pressure increased on European and Asian companies. UNCTAD has also warned that longer voyages around the Cape of Good Hope increase fuel, insurance, and emissions costs, placing particular strain on poorer countries and food-importing economies.

Economically, Hormuz threatens inflation through energy prices, while Bab al-Mandab does so through transport and goods. The former raises the price of oil, gas, electricity, and fuel, while the latter raises the cost of containers and delays intermediate goods, food products, and consumer items.

Therefore, Hormuz may have a faster and more severe impact on oil markets, while Bab al-Mandab has a broader impact on everyday trade and supply chains.

In conclusion, Hormuz is the more dangerous strait when considered on its own because it lies at the heart of the global energy market. Bab al-Mandab is less significant in oil terms but becomes highly dangerous when the Red Sea turns into the alternative export route for Gulf supplies.

In that scenario, the world is no longer facing a single strait crisis, but a dual blockade: Hormuz choking the Gulf from the east, and Bab al-Mandab choking its alternative outlet from the west.

The result is an escalation beyond rising oil prices into a true test of the global economy’s ability to withstand a simultaneous energy and shipping shock.