At first glance, it may seem that the rejection by the Secretary-General of “Hezbollah,” Naim Qassem, of the understandings that emerged from the Washington negotiations constituted a challenge to Israel and the United States.

However, a closer look at the political scene that followed the American announcement leads to a completely different conclusion: the man who sought to derail the agreement actually, in effect, relieved Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and perhaps freed him from one of the most complex political dilemmas he has faced since the outbreak of the war.

The problem was not that Israel was enthusiastic about the agreement while “Hezbollah” was rejecting it. Quite the opposite. What the discussions inside the Israeli security cabinet revealed last Thursday showed that Netanyahu’s own government was divided over any ceasefire. Senior ministers called for continuing the war and expanding military operations, and some demanded completing what they describe as the “dismantling” of Hezbollah’s military structure before discussing any settlement.

Netanyahu was, in effect, caught between two opposing pressures: on one hand, the administration of President Donald Trump, which appeared keen to achieve a political breakthrough in Lebanon and create a new path that would stop the war and redraw the rules of engagement on the border. On the other hand, his coalition partners, who see a ceasefire now as a missed strategic opportunity to further weaken “Hezbollah.”

Lebanon and the American missed opportunity

In parallel with the American diplomatic activity, the Lebanese state was trying to seize a rare political moment. For the first time in years, a window appeared to be open in Washington that Lebanon could potentially benefit from.

President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and the Lebanese negotiating delegation sought to take advantage of the American desire to achieve a political breakthrough on the Lebanese front, as well as the emerging divergence between Trump and Netanyahu regarding the management of the war and its outcomes.

From here came Lebanon’s insistence on securing as many political and security gains as possible before reaching any final understanding. The Lebanese negotiator was not only negotiating a ceasefire; he was also trying to obtain American guarantees related to a comprehensive end to the war, strengthening the role of the Lebanese army, opening the door to broader Israeli withdrawals, and possibly re-establishing the position of the Lebanese state as the only internationally recognized partner in managing the south.

For this reason, the American announcement was not merely a military truce. It carried within it the beginning of a different political path based on strengthening the presence of the Lebanese state in the border areas, and on testing a new model in which legitimate authority would be the sole security reference south of the Litani.

However, “Hezbollah”’s swift rejection of the understandings changed the entire scene. Instead of placing Netanyahu under American pressure, it eased that pressure on him. Instead of enabling the Lebanese state to capitalize on Trump’s push toward a settlement, it weakened its negotiating position. And instead of keeping attention focused on Israeli conditions and the need to stop attacks, attention shifted to the side that rejected the agreement from the outset.

Here lies the fundamental dilemma facing Lebanon today. While the state tries to benefit from any American Israeli divergence to gain national advantages, “Hezbollah” insists on dealing with the file from a completely different angle, tied to the calculations of regional conflict and its position within the Iranian axis.

The result is that the official Lebanese state found itself losing a card it was trying to use, while Netanyahu found himself relieved of a heavy political burden that had threatened to ignite internal divisions within his government.

Thus, the real question may not be why Naim Qassem rejected the Washington agreement, but rather what this rejection actually achieved.

So far, the answer appears clear: it gave Netanyahu what he needed most of all, a justification to continue the war without bearing responsibility for aborting a chance to stop it.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.