Security or statehood? The doctrine clash shaping Israel-Lebanon talks

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Opinion 30-05-2026 | 08:46

Security or statehood? The doctrine clash shaping Israel-Lebanon talks

Washington-backed negotiations are testing whether state authority can become the region’s main security guarantee.
Fares Khashan
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Security or statehood? The doctrine clash shaping Israel-Lebanon talks
An image of the moment Israel targeted a building in the city of Tyre, southern Lebanon, on May 28, 2026. (AFP)
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The ongoing direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, under American sponsorship, do not appear to be just another attempt to establish a ceasefire. Behind the military and security details lies a confrontation of a different kind: a confrontation between two doctrines.

 

The first is what is known in Israel as the “Dahiya Doctrine,” while the second is the doctrine that official Lebanon, through the Lebanese army and state institutions, is seeking to impose as an alternative.

 

The Dahiya Doctrine emerged after the July 2006 war, taking its name from the southern suburbs of Beirut, which suffered widespread destruction at the time.

 

However, this doctrine was not tied to a specific geographic area so much as it expressed a security philosophy based on a simple idea: preventing any future threat by inflicting heavy costs on the environment from which that threat emerges.

 

Over the past years, this doctrine has become a component of Israeli security thinking toward Lebanon. As Hezbollah's military capabilities have grown, the conviction has grown among wide Israeli circles that deterrence is not achieved merely by targeting fighters and military installations, but also by preventing the rebuilding of the environment that enables the threat to reemerge.

 

This is why the level of incitement witnessed in Israel over the past months is understandable. Political, media, and security voices have called for the expansion of operations inside Lebanon and for preventing the rebuilding of the party’s military capabilities.

 

Some hardliners have even called for widespread destruction of Lebanese infrastructure, arguing that the security of northern Israel can only be achieved through a radical change in the reality on the other side of the border.

 

However, the recent war also showed the limits of this approach; the United States did not hide its desire to prevent a repeat of the widespread destruction seen in the southern suburbs and its expansion toward the Lebanese capital.

 

Yet even this shift did not prevent Israel, on the pretext of imposing a formula aimed at removing threats to its soldiers and settlements, from confining the geographic scope of the “Dahiya Doctrine” without completely abandoning it, as evidenced by the violent targeting of the city of Tyre and the widespread displacement affecting the districts of Jezzine and Sidon.

 

This is precisely where the role official Lebanon is trying to define for itself begins. The Lebanese state is not only seeking to stop the raids or secure Israel’s withdrawal from the areas into which it has expanded its occupation. What it is actually seeking is to eliminate the justification on which the Dahiya Doctrine relies, in all its old and updated forms.

 

The essence of the Lebanese proposal is based on a clear equation: if the goal is to prevent any threat emanating from Lebanese soil, the entity that should undertake this task is the Lebanese state itself, represented by the Lebanese army and legitimate agencies, rather than Israeli warplanes.

 

This is where the ongoing negotiations, especially on the military track, gain exceptional importance. They are not only discussing ceasefire arrangements but also the transfer of security responsibility from the logic of direct Israeli intervention to that of the Lebanese state, capable of imposing its authority over its territory.

 

 

The Lebanese Army and the Missed Opportunity

 

Sources familiar with the vision of Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal reveal that the military institution considers that a valuable opportunity was lost on the morning of March 2, when rockets were fired from Lebanese territory toward Israel.

 

According to this perspective, that incident could have turned into a completely different practical model. The army was ready to move and pursue those responsible for firing the rockets, while the government and Ministry of Justice were expected to support this course with strict legal and judicial measures to affirm that the Lebanese state would not allow any entity to drag the country into a military confrontation outside its authority.

 

Inquiries with Ministry of Justice sources about that phase indicate that Minister Adel Nassar was indeed preparing to move in this direction, based on a firm legal and judicial approach aimed at referring the culprits to the Judicial Council, thereby cementing the state’s responsibility in pursuing anyone who endangers Lebanon’s national security.

 

However, Israel’s rapid expansion of military operations following the rocket launch changed the situation. The priority shifted to addressing the fast-moving field repercussions, and the political and security conditions that could have enabled such a course became more complicated, leading to a retreat from the initial momentum and generating hesitation among decision-makers.

 

This, in turn, limited the ability to implement the Cabinet’s decision mandating the army and security forces to arrest anyone carrying weapons, regardless of affiliation, and to refer them to the competent judiciary.

 

In the view of the Lebanese army, the problem was not only in firing the rockets, but also in the state not being given the full opportunity to prove its ability to handle the matter itself.

 

If that path had succeeded, the situation today would look different. The state would appear before both the Lebanese public and the international community as the entity that initiates, pursues, and holds accountable, rather than one that merely reacts. It would have been possible to establish a new model in which any security breach originating from Lebanese soil is addressed by the state itself—legally, security-wise, and militarily. This is precisely the framework Lebanon seeks to establish today.

 

The Lebanese army does not present itself as merely a force deployed on the ground, but as a practical alternative to the Dahiya Doctrine. It implicitly argues that granting the Lebanese state full capacity to exercise its security and judicial powers is the only path to a sustainable ceasefire.

 

Stability is not achieved through mutual destruction, preventive raids, or keeping Lebanon an open arena for military interventions. Stability is achieved when the state becomes the sole authority over weapons, security, and law.

 

For this reason, the real battle behind the scenes is not just about borders, nor merely about a ceasefire, but about the identity of the entity that protects the borders.

 

Israel is still seeking guarantees for the security of its north. Lebanon is trying to persuade it, and the international community before it, that this guarantee can be provided by the Lebanese state itself.

 

If this path succeeds, the outcome will not be merely a cessation of war, but a transition from the Dahiya Doctrine to a doctrine of the state.

 

 

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.

Tags
direct negotiations ، Southern Suburbs of Beirut ، Hezbollah ، Tyre ، Sidon ، Lebanese Army ، Lebanon ، Israel ، ceasefire ، United States ، Rodolphe Haykal