Despite the initial anticipation in Lebanon regarding the expected understanding between the United States and Iran, which is supposed to help consolidate the ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hezbollah due to the latter’s significant reliance on Iran and its involvement at this level, giving it a justification to halt the war on its side at least, diplomatic sources confirm that Iran’s involvement in the Lebanese file will stop at this limit.

Meanwhile, there are confirmations in Washington, at least so far, of separating the track of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel from the effects of the Iran negotiations or their implications, given Iran’s direct interest in preventing further weakening of Hezbollah and the erosion of its capabilities.

The Lebanese state has succeeded in ensuring the neutrality of Beirut, its vital institutions, and infrastructure in the ongoing war between Israel and Hezbollah, which has escalated following recent tensions between the two sides. These tensions threatened to bring Israeli strikes back to areas of Hezbollah control in Beirut. Tel Aviv has cited coordination with Washington regarding a strike targeting a Hezbollah leader in Choueifat in the southern suburb of Beirut as an example of its compliance with the American-established red lines concerning the exclusion of the Lebanese capital from attacks, and even the demolition of buildings under the pretext of targeting specific leaders or operatives. It also claims it does not deviate from these lines except with prior coordination, in order not to disrupt the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran and not to embarrass the Lebanese state or undermine its capabilities, which would give Hezbollah leverage against it.

On the eve of the first round of military talks between Lebanon and Israel at the Pentagon, southern Lebanon has been emptied of its residents and more villages have been destroyed as Israel expands its incursion beyond the Litani River, on the path toward maturing the understanding between the United States and Iran, which faltered last week and was meant to be finalized after being close to announcement on Sunday. Although the ceasefire largely holds between the two sides with occasional violations, negotiations are taking place amid the continuation of proxy warfare in Lebanon as a means of mutual pressure.

Israel, in its strike on Choueifat in the southern suburb of Beirut, referenced full coordination with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, as if explaining or justifying a breach that could threaten these negotiations or obstruct the emerging understanding. At the same time, Washington has not spared further pressure measures and new sanctions on Tehran, which in turn is seeking to exert pressure through Lebanon in an attempt to empty the direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel in their security round at the Pentagon and then the political round next week of their substance, keeping them within the framework that Iran holds the “Hezbollah” card and therefore the ability to use it in dealings with the United States, either positively or negatively.

Iranian and American flags

Are the complex negotiations between the United States and Iran overshadowing the Lebanese track?

The ongoing complex negotiations between the United States and Iran continue to overshadow the Lebanese track and its prospects for progress, particularly amid major contradictions in the overall situation. On one hand, Hezbollah considers what it sees as an Iranian victory in its confrontation with the United States and the impact this has on it. On the other hand, there are differing assessments suggesting that Iran is in fact focused on efforts to save itself, its system, and its ability to continue.

This comes at a time when independent journalism in both the United States and Israel, along with political calculations in both countries, is leaving significant space for the promotion of the Iranian narrative of victory. Hezbollah seeks to exploit this narrative as a confirmed and inevitable victory, especially given the belief held by many that Iran’s effort to recover billions of dollars of frozen assets, as appeared in its negotiations in Qatar, could translate into renewed funding for Hezbollah and a replenishment of its financial networks as in the past.

As a result, many fear that if the emerging understanding opens the door to further negotiations between the United States and Iran on the nuclear file within sixty days, this may lead to continued fluctuations in Lebanon, especially since Lebanon is being used as a key channel for exchanging messages between the two sides, particularly if Hezbollah remains outside the direct negotiations between them and is left to indirect bargaining.

Many issues related to preserving Lebanon’s interests depend on the security arrangements sponsored by Washington between Lebanon and Israel to ensure the latter’s withdrawal from the south. These arrangements could place Iran in a difficult position, not only because they forcibly distance Hezbollah from areas in the south and from direct contact with Israel, especially as Israel now occupies a significant portion of it, but also because they would displace most residents of the Shiite community and destroy their villages in a way that could prevent their return for years.

Given the significant imbalance in the balance of power, it is likely that any agreement or arrangements will lead to continued U.S. commitment to cooperating with Israel to contain Iran’s destabilizing activities in Lebanon, including preventing the transfer of weapons or any Iranian support, and recognizing Israel’s right to respond to threats emanating from Lebanese territory under international law, particularly in the southern region.

This was indirectly included in the agreement of 26 November 2024, drafted through the mediation of Speaker Nabih Berri, with his approval on behalf of Hezbollah and with its mandate, alongside implicit Iranian approval of the exclusivity of arms in the hands of Lebanese security forces alone, without any organization or faction outside the state.

It will be very difficult for this to change or be reversed, given the extent of Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon and the heavy costs of dragging Lebanon into a war that its people did not want. This, however, does not mean that the negotiating path for Lebanon will be easy—quite the opposite.

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Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar