Donald Trump’s approach of maneuvering between advancing and holding back in negotiations with Iran, via the Pakistan channel, may be part of a diplomatic and media tactic that conceals a deeper intention: preparing for the optimal moment to return to a highly violent and intense round of confrontation. This could culminate in a new, massive blow to the regime and its instruments of power, including remaining missile platforms, shelters, and kamikaze drone stockpiles, as well as a significant portion of critical energy facilities.

What is prolonging the negotiations?

Fear of Iranian retaliation against regional countries, in response to its anticipated heavy losses, may explain the continuation of prolonged and ultimately futile negotiations, ones the U.S. administration likely recognizes will not produce satisfactory outcomes. In fact, these talks may instead reinforce the regime internally and entrench Tehran’s strategy of extortion, particularly with regard to passage through the Strait of Hormuz. This approach could further expand into a form of sustained security-based leverage over key regional economic interests, especially as Iran continues to absorb the consequences of the June 2025 and February 2026 wars.

In this sense, if the U.S. President opts for a settlement as promoted by the Pakistani side, it would amount to involvement in a war that concludes without achieving any of the four objectives set for the current conflict.

The nuclear issue cannot be resolved without ending the military dimension of the program by dismantling all nuclear facilities, leaving only one for civilian purposes, possibly “Bushehr” under Russian supervision. Maintaining 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium in the possession of the current regime is unacceptable, as it is widely recognized that the nuclear program it is vigorously defending is, in essence, a military one. As for dismantling the missile program and halting the production of thousands of drones that threaten neighboring countries and American bases in the region, these were among the conditions set by the U.S. President prior to the war and at the moment of launching the attack on Iran.

What about the arms?

Regarding Iran’s regional arms, the problem will persist unless the security and financial channels linking the regime to its militias across the region, particularly Hezbollah and major factions in Iraq, are severed.

A key element of the American demands preceding the war, framed as objectives to be achieved, concerns the issue of internal security repression in Iran, which escalated dramatically, with reports indicating that thousands, and in some estimates tens of thousands, of citizens were killed in the streets during last January’s crackdown.

All of this reflects the extent to which the current negotiations diverge from the primary objectives set by the U.S. administration for the war against the Iranian regime. In contrast, Tehran approaches the demands as though only the Strait of Hormuz issue is under discussion, while the nuclear file excludes any consideration of handing over highly enriched uranium to the Americans or dismantling facilities to leave just one under strict U.S. supervision. Nor do the talks address the ballistic missile program, the advanced drone program, or the regional proxy militias.

So, what is the point of negotiation? What is the rationale behind giving the regime the opportunity to fully exploit time to achieve two objectives: first, to catch its breath and reorganize its military capabilities; and second, to draw the U.S. President into the swamp of prolonged negotiations and the quagmire of maneuvers that ultimately serve Tehran’s interests more than those of Washington and Tel Aviv?

The reality is that if negotiations through the Pakistani channel continue along the same trajectory, the U.S. negotiating position will weaken in the face of an increasingly firm Iranian stance, despite the devastation caused by both wars. The hesitation of the U.S. President will erode any remaining prospects of securing support from traditionally allied countries, particularly given that America’s allies, including Britain, did not stand behind the United States in the current war. This, in turn, will reflect a diminished American posture and reinforce the image of the resilience of the regime in Tehran despite the severe blows it has endured.

Of course, this is not a call to return to war at any cost; rather, it is a reminder of the erosion of the U.S. negotiating position, aimed at highlighting the chaos that may result from yielding to Iranian extortion. It also underscores the diversion of attention away from critical and dangerous strategic files that are currently being neglected, ultimately leaving the entire region, including American and Western interests, vulnerable to unchecked security, military, and economic coercion.

The regime’s survival in the face of its current obligations will likely lead to intensified internal repression and greater instability across the region. Unless the strategic direction shifts toward decisively pressuring the Iranian regime, the region risks entering a prolonged period of difficulty that could extend for decades.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.