First – Preserving the Gains of the Armistice Agreement and Guarding Against the Pitfalls of Amendments

In this turmoil, the General Armistice Agreement is the fundamental and essential international document in affirming Lebanon’s international borders and the unity and integrity of its territory, as enshrined in Article 5, paragraph 1, not only vis-à-vis the international community but especially vis-à-vis Israel. According to its provisions, it constitutes the legal framework for resolving complaints submitted by both parties. More importantly, it is distinguished by its close connection to the United Nations Security Council, which endorsed it under Resolution No. 73 dated 11 November 1949, and relied upon it as a binding reference instrument, as is evident in the preamble and operative paragraphs of Resolutions 332 dated 2 April 1973 and 337 dated 15 August 1973, following Israel’s violation of Lebanese sovereignty deep into the city of Beirut and the “hijacking by the Israeli Air Force of a civilian Lebanese aircraft leased to Iraqi Airways.” The agreement remained resilient in terms of its legal value despite Israel’s claims of its annulment through reference to the ceasefire line following the 1967 war rather than the armistice line, even though Lebanon did not participate in that war, thus nullifying that argument at the international level. Israel also raised the issue of the Cairo Agreement, which Foreign Minister of the second Shihabist era Fouad Boutros described during deliberations on Resolution 425 (1978) as “null and void,” before the Lebanese state proceeded to cancel it in 1987. It should be noted that the Lebanese government had already refused to rely on the Cairo Agreement “with regard to the deployment of international security forces and the positioning of the Lebanese Army in the South in 1978” (Ghassan Tueni archives on Resolution 425, p. 119, and my article in Annahar, in two parts dated 7 and 11 November 2025, titled “The Story of UNIFIL and Lebanese Diplomacy and the Avenues and Windows of Resolution 2790”).

Despite sincere intentions and numerous attempts by the Lebanese state to halt violations, they have continued, albeit intermittently, from both sides of the border, even if the reasons have varied.

The Armistice Agreement is characterized by a difficult amendment mechanism that excluded from revision by both parties Articles 1 and 3 thereof. These two articles prohibit the armed forces of either party from undertaking, planning, or threatening any hostile act against the people or armed forces of the other party, and prevent any category of military or paramilitary forces of either side from committing any warlike or hostile act against the forces of the other party. Likewise, it is not permitted, for any purpose whatsoever, for the forces of either party to cross or traverse the armistice line, which is in fact and in law the international border of Lebanon with Palestine.

Beyond the fundamental right of any party to request amendment of an armistice agreement, the concerns of the Security Council at the time were focused on “removing the threat to peace in Palestine,” and thus establishing a firm and stable armistice in all its sectors, including also “all parties directly related to the conflict,” including Lebanon. It required the “drawing of permanent armistice lines which the armed forces of the concerned parties may not cross,” pursuant to Security Council Resolution 62 issued under Chapter VII on 16 November 1948.

It appears that the Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon fall within binding steps undertaken in response to the Security Council’s request in the aforementioned resolution.

According to the Council’s characterization, these agreements are considered “temporary measures,” based on the terminology of Article 40 of the United Nations Charter, within a series of escalating measures in the event of a deteriorating situation, including the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter. By way of clarification, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in official document A/670/Add.1, published in 1968: “These agreements were considered at the time of their negotiation as merely a step towards peace, not the basis for a permanent pattern of life in the Middle East. These agreements are not peace treaties.”

Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that the amendment mechanism referred to above is simplified and readily available for Lebanon to propose what suits it without obstacles, practice regarding the amendment of international resolutions or statements within the United Nations has settled on relying first and foremost on the original text rather than replacing it, building upon it instead, because it embodies a consensus among the concerned parties resulting from often arduous efforts depending on the importance of the text. Secondly, introducing a new draft text may disturb existing balances, encourage additional new proposals, and lead to further complexities of negotiation and bargaining. For this reason, the usual practice is to limit changes to what is possible within the scope of consensus on the subject.

In the event that Lebanon were to initiate a request to “develop,” “strengthen,” “consolidate,” or propose amendments to some provisions of the agreement, and unless it is in a position of strength, confidence, and full awareness of the costs, I fear matters could slip in a way that would endanger Lebanon’s acquired rights, particularly:

a) Article 5, paragraph 1 on borders (“The armistice line follows the international border between Lebanon and Palestine”), based on the demarcation set out in the Paulet–Newcombe Agreement signed on 7 March 1923, a copy of which was deposited with the League of Nations in 1924. My insistence on Article 5(1) is reinforced by the fact that Lebanon’s borders are final, demarcated, and internationally recognized, whereas there are currently active Israeli calls issued by extremist Jewish agencies and organizations to settle in its south and promote the theory of “artificial borders.”

b) Articles 1 and 3 concerning the prohibition of committing any “aggressive, warlike, or hostile act” against the military or paramilitary forces of the other party, and prohibiting crossing or traversing the armistice line, including airspace and maritime waters within three miles of the coastal line for either party.

c) Article 8, paragraph 3, which excludes Articles 1 and 3 from review, amendment, or suspension if requested by either party.

In this regard, I refer to paragraph 43 of the reference introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the work of the Organization for the period 16 June 1966 to 15 June 1967, concerning “the four Armistice Agreements concluded through the United Nations between the Arabs (including Lebanon) and the Israelis,” which states that they “provide for revision or suspension by mutual agreement between the signatory parties. They contain no provision authorizing unilateral termination of their application. This remained the position of the United Nations until a competent authority decided otherwise.” The old remains as it was.

d) Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 6, relating to the system of monitoring the armistice line, particularly the tasks assigned to United Nations observers under the supervision of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), established under Security Council Resolution 50 dated 29 May 1948, whose observers are utilized by UNIFIL in monitoring and observation operations along the Blue Line.

In this context, the fundamental link between UNIFIL and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (both of which are peacekeeping forces) is the Secretary-General’s first reference report on UNIFIL’s operational mechanism, document S/12611, adopted under Security Council Resolution 426 dated 19 March 1978. Based on this report, UNTSO “international observers” are provided to assist UNIFIL in carrying out its mission. They are “placed under UNIFIL’s operational command and control” during the performance of monitoring, verification, and reporting duties.

At a time when speculation is growing about the Security Council’s options after the expiry of the international force’s mandate in southern Lebanon on 31 January 2026, monitoring, observation, verification, communication, and reporting activities remain ongoing. These tasks continue to be performed by military observers along the Armistice Line (under the mandate and authority of UNTSO), as previously defined by the UN Secretary-General in paragraph (e) of the aforementioned reference report, in which he anticipated that UNIFIL’s mandate would one day end due to its temporary nature. This is an important paragraph that has rarely been raised in recent years (further details in the above-mentioned articles). Since these tasks constitute the bare minimum requirement, I believe that the situation in southern Lebanon calls for strengthening them in order to reinforce and emphasize Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders, in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of Resolution 1701.

The Armistice Agreement includes an “Annex on the Definition of Defense Forces” regarding Lebanon and regarding Israel, which in my view should be read in light of contemporary international legal and field developments, especially as it established a limited framework for manpower and equipment of a defensive nature, aimed at reducing friction and confrontations in order to preserve the armistice.

With regard to Lebanon, the Security Council established UNIFIL in 1978, which deployed in its area of operations in the South, alongside the reinforcement of the Lebanese Army to extend state authority in accordance with its resolutions. The Council has since undertaken the reconfiguration of UNIFIL in line with operational needs and circumstances.

On the Israeli side of the border, there is no international presence due to Israeli reservations. However, Israeli military concentrations themselves have exceeded the constraints set out in the annex to the agreement and have often resulted in crossings beyond the border line into Lebanese territory and its occupation.

In short, bloody events have not ceased, yet the Armistice Agreement remains standing and valid, and it cannot be unilaterally revoked. It thus provides legal protection for Lebanon and derives its momentum from the United Nations Security Council, which “confirms the validity of the agreement” under Resolution 450 dated 14 June 1979, despite acts of hostility and despite Israel’s contrary position since the June 1976 war, based on an old expansionist outlook. This is also despite Lebanon having become, as Dr. Abdel Al Raouf Sinu notes in his book "The Great Lebanon, Or is Lebanon a Historical Mistake? Disputes over Entity Genesis and Identity", “a platform for sending messages between competing regional axes.” Lebanon has, as is well known, carried Palestinian, Syrian, Israeli, and more recently Iranian messages.

Therefore, any amendment to the Armistice Agreement requires full vigilance in order to safeguard Lebanon’s rights, because amending an agreement or resolution is, in my view, similar to cosmetic surgery: if the doctor does not act carefully, the result of “cosmetic enhancement” may end in distortion. The same applies to any future supplementary or alternative formulation. It should also be noted that had the agreement been implemented fully and without fragmentation, matters would, in my estimation, have taken a very different course.