Economically, Iran possesses large resources but desperately needs to open up to the world and attract foreign investment to revive its economy under suffocating sanctions.
However, a narrative of absolute enmity toward America and the West makes any real openness appear as a retreat from principles and a betrayal of the revolution. The result is an ailing economy and a population that pays the price.
In the nuclear file, Iran can make concessions to lift sanctions and improve its situation. However, the narrative of “Iran’s absolute right to enrichment,” “resisting Western pressures,” and acquiring a nuclear weapon to fortify the narrative and the project without explicitly stating so limits the negotiation space and makes any concession seem like surrender.
The regime finds itself compelled to maintain the image of the “resistant state,” even when national interests require more pragmatic policies.
Foreign proxies
In foreign policy, Iran is doctrinally obliged to support its regional allies: “Hezbollah” in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, resistance factions in Iraq, and the Syrian regime in the past.
This support drains the country’s resources and increases the regime’s international isolation.
Yet, retracting from it is immediately read as a retreat from the principles of the revolution and an unforgivable weakness.
When narrative trumps interest
This is precisely what it means for a state to be “hostage to its narrative”: the regime cannot easily abandon its narrative, as its collapse would mean the fall of its own legitimacy.
On the other hand, continuing to adhere to it deepens economic and political crises, making any real reform almost impossible without “breaking the narrative mold” that has trapped it.
Thus, the Iranian regime revolves in a vicious circle: a rigid narrative prevents adaptation, lack of adaptation deepens the crisis, and the crisis reinforces adherence to the narrative.
This condition becomes more complicated amid the leadership crisis the regime faces, especially following the assassination of first- and second-tier leaders, including former leader Ali Khamenei, making it difficult for new leaders to offer concessions central to the regime since 1979.
The price is paid by the people
One cannot discuss this dilemma without touching on the Iranian people who pay the highest price. While the regime uses the narrative to maintain its power, citizens suffer from escalating inflation, chronic unemployment, suffocating social constraints, and the threat of renewed war at any moment.
Many Iranians, especially the youth and middle class in urban areas, feel they are more hostages to this narrative than the regime itself.
Iran is a nation governed more by narrative than by interest. What began as a tool for unifying ranks and mobilizing the masses at the start of the revolution has now become a restraint limiting the state’s ability to adapt to a rapidly changing world.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.