The Shiite community in Lebanon is currently undergoing a profound redefinition of its position within the state, not merely a fleeting political crisis, as the foundations of Hezbollah’s longstanding influence—protection, sponsorship, and narrative monopoly—waver.

Hezbollah, which built its legitimacy on the promise of resistance and its capacity to provide security and services, and which convinced its constituency that the cost of arms is lower than abandoning them, now faces a test that is not only military but also social, psychological, and political.

This moment did not just begin with the 2024 war, but rather has deeper historical roots. After independence, the Shiite community in Lebanon emerged from the margins of the state, placed in a tertiary position within the system by the National Pact of 1943 and the 1932 census, while the south and the Bekaa were effectively excluded from meaningful development.

Then, Musa al-Sadr arrived in 1959 and began transforming Lebanese Shiism from a fragmented local identity into a broader social and national cause centered on deprivation, dignity, and rights. At its core, his project was an attempt at inclusion rather than separation; integrating Shiites into the state rather than isolating them, and elevating their position through citizenship rather than building a parallel power structure.

The rise of Hezbollah

However, the civil war, al-Sadr’s disappearance, the Iranian Revolution, and the Israeli invasion all opened a different path. In this context, Hezbollah rose not merely as a military organization, but as an integrated system for reshaping identity.

Hezbollah linked religious grievances with political threat, resistance with arms, and loyalty with protection, reinforcing these ties through a network of services, education, welfare, and an alternative economy.

From schools to scouting, and from Husseini councils to credit services, compensation schemes, and salaries for fighters and employees in its institutions, a deep connection developed between the party and its environment: it provides protection, services, and compensation, while its environment grants it trust, cover, and accepts the costs.

A feeling of dominance

The climax of this equation was reached after Israel withdrew from the south in 2000 and following the 2006 July War, when many Shiites felt they had moved from being a marginalized sect to a more dominant position.

However, this very shift began to generate widespread Lebanese anxiety. The events of May 7, 2008, marked a pivotal moment, as it appeared that the weapon once legitimized as a tool of resistance against Israel could now be decisively used in internal politics.

At that point, the first ethical question emerged within parts of the Shiite community: where does resistance end and dominance begin?

The Syria conflict reshaped its role 

Then, the intervention in Syria revealed a deeper dimension in the party’s project. Resistance was no longer confined to Lebanese borders or to combating Israel, as it was originally established as part of Iran’s expansionist project, and the party successfully justified this to its supporters with rhetoric of protecting shrines and an existential battle, albeit at a high moral and political cost.

The Syrian conflict transformed the party from the image of a defender into a cross-border actor and deepened the rift between those who see this role as a preemptive protection for the sect and those who view it as an entanglement that brought heavy costs on Shiites in particular and Lebanese in general, which they did not decide.

The 2019 Uprising raised questions

In October 17, 2019, this tension surfaced, albeit partially. Shiite youths in areas under the influence of the party and the Amal Movement protested against a political system of which the party itself was a part.

Although the subsequent economic collapse reinvigorated the party’s welfare role, especially as its institutions continued operating and providing relatively better services compared to the collapse of the state and the banking sector, the crisis did not disappear. Public voices quieted, but internal questions remained.

Pivotal decision to enter the "support front"

The "support front" after October 7, 2023, placed this narrative under unprecedented public scrutiny. For years, the idea of unified fronts and regional deterrence was promoted, yet the party’s actions remained below the threshold of full-scale war.

Among its supporters, this was seen as wisdom and calculated conflict management, whereas its opponents viewed it as a revelation of real power limits.

Between these readings, a muted question emerged within the Shiite environment: what are the costs? What are the limits? And who decides war and peace?

The 2024 war shock

However, 2024 marked the moment of greatest shock: assassinations, explosions targeting communication devices, and strikes against leadership and operational infrastructure, culminating in the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, were not merely military losses.

They were blows to the core image the party had constructed for itself: a fortified organization, a commanding leadership, deterrent capability, and security within its environment. When the ceasefire arrived, the celebration of victory appeared more as a psychological defense mechanism than as a declaration of battlefield achievement.

Mere survival became framed as victory, and mere endurance as proof of legitimacy, yet all of this was insufficient to conceal the magnitude of the transformation.

More critically, the party was not only tested after the war in its combat capabilities but also in the strain placed on its welfare system. The environment that accepted the cost now awaits compensation, reconstruction, and social protection.

When the capacity for compensation declines, the implicit contract between the party and its base begins to waver. The question is no longer whether the party can fight, but whether it can protect the daily life of those who bore the cost of its combat.

Here, the long-standing Shiite division resurfaces in a new form. The Amal Movement, which has remained closer to traditional Lebanese politics and to Musa al-Sadr’s legacy, appears today more present as a channel of communication with the state and the outside world, while Hezbollah bears the burden of a regional project that has become more costly and less capable of generating reassurance.

This does not necessarily imply the disintegration of the Shiite duality, but rather a redistribution of roles within it, potentially marked by a renewed emphasis on the national project for the sect alongside a relative retreat of the ideological project.

Some members of the Shiite community may perceive a retreat from the logic of arms as relinquishing the only guarantee in a troubled country. These fears are understandable when viewed through a long history of marginalization, wars, and Israeli aggression.

However, experience has shown that arms outside the state do not eliminate fear but can reproduce it. They may protect in one moment and then create isolation in another. They may grant a sense of strength, but also place the entire community in confrontation with potentially catastrophic consequences for decisions in which it does not participate.

The need for nation above party

Therefore, the priority today appears clear: no party above the state, no sect greater than the homeland, and no resistance without a national collective decision.

Today, Shiites, like all of Lebanon, need a bold transition from the logic of the patron to the logic of citizenship, from the logic of organizational protection to the logic of constitutional protection, from a party-based service economy to the justice of the national state, and from sectarian memory to a renewed national contract that ensures rights without parallel arms.

The Shiite future in Lebanon will not be safeguarded by retreating into an exhausted or weakened party, nor by merely renewing a rhetoric of grievance, nor by presenting survival alone as victory.

It will be secured when Shiites become a full part of the state, not an alternative to it; when southern security becomes a national decision rather than a regional card; and when politics is reclaimed from militarization, institutions from informal networks, and nationalism from sectarian divisions.

The question is no longer how Hezbollah maintains its strength, but how Shiites maintain their position in a country that cannot recover while one sect remains outside the state and other sects either fear it or fear for it.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.