Since the outbreak of the war on Gaza, Jordan has witnessed gradual transformations in public sentiment, shifting from intense emotional mobilization to a more complex approach as the conflict expanded regionally.

In the first weeks, public responses focused on broad solidarity with Gaza as a central issue affecting national security and social peace. However, the shift to what can be described as a “limited regional war,” involving strikes on Iran and clashes on the Lebanese front, introduced a new dimension, reordering the priorities of segments of public opinion amid growing concerns about the direct implications for domestic stability and national security in Jordan.

In this context, popular solidarity with Gaza has not diminished but has come to coexist with more pragmatic considerations. Economic and security concerns have emerged as pressing factors, particularly with the rising cost of living, persistent supply chain disruptions, and fears of potential disruptions in key maritime routes such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, amid the possibility of the conflict widening. These factors have led segments of society, especially within the middle class, to reassess their priorities between supporting regional transnational causes and preserving economic and living stability.

Despite historical residues related to sub-national identities and political and organizational loyalties, the Gaza issue has maintained a high level of national consensus across origins, backgrounds, and political affiliations. However, the recent introduction of the Iranian and Lebanese dimensions into the equation has contributed to emerging differences in political interpretations of events, where some groups view the conflict through the lens of regional balances and the risks of sliding into a wider war, without it translating into any sharp or significant social division within Jordan’s social fabric or national security.

On the popular movement front, the war in Gaza and its regional expansion has resulted in a wave of protests considered the largest in Jordan since the Arab Spring in 2011. These protests have been fueled by a combination of factors, most notably the humanitarian and popular dimension linked to Gaza, the perception of weak official Arab effectiveness, alongside internal accumulations related to economic conditions and unemployment. Social media has played a central role in accelerating mobilization and expanding the participatory base, especially among youth, giving the protests a dynamic and rapidly spreading character.

Conversely, Jordanian security apparatuses have professionally dealt with this wave through a dual approach, balancing limited and controlled space for expression with field restrictions when certain movements were deemed potentially risky beyond peaceful protest. This flexible approach contributed to containing escalation and preventing it from turning into an open crisis, yet it also led to a gradual decline in protest momentum, while a degree of underlying tension remained within certain circles, particularly among traditional opposition forces and organized political currents and parties.

Economically and socially, the war in Gaza and the war involving Iran have deepened the structural challenges facing Jordan, as these developments have revived fears related to the possibility of new refugee inflows from the occupied Palestinian territories into a country already hosting large numbers of refugees, placing additional pressure on resources and services. Critical sectors such as tourism and investment have also been negatively affected by the state of instability, with insurance and transport costs rising, while the decline in commercial and tourist activity has increased pressure on the Jordanian economy in general.

At the same time, young people face complex challenges represented by high unemployment rates and declining economic opportunities, alongside a growing sense of the lack of a political horizon. This intersection between economic pressures and regional tensions deepens feelings of frustration, making them more likely to translate into political expressions, especially in a digital media environment that accelerates interaction and mobilization.

As for the future, alleviating pressures on Jordan is linked to the extent to which this “limited regional war” can be contained and prevented from turning into an all-out confrontation. In this context, the role of Arab coordination, especially between Jordan and the Gulf states, in providing economic support and enhancing the stability of energy supplies stands out. Any shift in U.S. policy towards de-escalation or the revival of diplomatic pathways will directly affect the reduction of tensions, particularly given the continued importance of American support for Jordan at this sensitive stage.

Conversely, the possibilities for internal escalation remain, given the current military escalation against Iran and its geographical expansion, if negotiations between it and the United States fail, or if the Jordanian economy is subjected to further shocks.

The fundamental challenge remains the state’s ability to balance responding to popular pressures with the requirements of stability, in a highly volatile and rapidly changing regional environment, where external crises often turn into complex internal tests that Jordan has repeatedly experienced throughout its modern history.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.